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Income trust units are some of the highest selling products in the 
Canadian securities industry, but they have been less successful beyond 
Canadian borders. The author discusses the remarkable profitability and 
proliferation of income trusts in Canada, but maintains that arguments in 
favour of income trusts as a sound investment are either overstated, 
inconsistent, or apt to mislead retail investors. Instead, the author argues 
that the Canadian income trust phenomenon is an irrational development 
in the Canadian capital market: a bubble. The income trust boom exhibits 
characteristics typical to a bubble: story leverage, opportunistic support 
by interested parties, and overoptimistic retail investors. The author 
identifies striking similarities between the current market for income trusts 
and the Tech Bubble of 1999 and 2000, examining data relating to noise 
trading and limits on arbitrage in income trusts. The author counters 
arguments that the bubble risk in income trusts is low.  
Nevertheless, the author accepts that some firms may be structured 
effectively as income trusts. To mitigate the dangers of income trust 
investment, the author proposes five regulatory measures, four of which 
address idiosyncrasies of income trusts and one which addresses a 
fundamental issue of securities regulation. First, promulgators need to 
address the misallocation of capital by tax incentives for investments in 
low-growth business. Second, weak trust governance should be addressed 
by imposing default governance structures similar to those of shareholders 
and corporations. Third, investors should have some control over the 
distribution policy of the income trust. Fourth, there is an insufficient 
number of institutional investors in the market for income trusts and, 
consequently, promulgators should avoid any limit on institutional 
investment in income trusts. Last, regulators increasingly need to watch 
the conduct of broker-dealers and mutual fund managers, as a means of 
protecting retail investors from the marketing of investment products that 
fit some, but not all, investors. Mutual fund marketing needs to be 
monitored in order to avoid an over-supply of investment capital in 
narrow markets. 
 
Les unités de fonds de titres à revenu fixe sont certains produits qui se 
vendent le mieux dans l’industrie canadienne en titres, mais elles n’ont 
pas eu une aussi bonne réussite au-delà des frontières canadiennes. 
L’auteur démontre la rentabilité remarquable et la prolifération des fonds 
de titres à revenu fixe au Canada, mais maintient que les arguments en 
faveur des fonds de titres à revenu fixe en tant que bon investissement sont 
soit surévalués, inconsistants ou disposés à tromper les investisseurs au 
détail. L’auteur argumente plutôt que le phénomène de fonds de titres à 
revenu fixe canadien est un développement irrationnel dans le marché 
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financier canadien : une bulle. Le boom des fonds de titres à revenu fixe 
démontre des caractéristiques typiques d’une bulle : un effet par étapes, 
un appui opportuniste par des parties intéressées et des investisseurs de 
détail trop optimistes. L’auteur identifie des similarités remarquables 
entre le marché actuel pour les fonds de titres à revenu fixe et la Bulle 
Tech de 1999 et 2000 en tenant compte les données liées au bruit de 
commerce et aux limites d’arbitrage dans les fonds de titres à revenu fixe. 
L’auteur réagit contre les arguments qui indiquent que le risque d’une 
bulle est minime dans les fonds de titres à revenu fixe.  
Néanmoins, l’auteur accepte que certains organismes peuvent être 
structurés efficacement en tant que fonds de titres à revenu fixe. Pour 
atténuer les dangers des investissements de fonds de titres à revenu fixe, 
l’auteur propose cinq mesures réglementaires, quatre d’entres elles au 
sujet des idiosyncrasies des fonds de titres à revenu fixe et une au sujet du 
problème fondamental dans le règlement des titres. Premièrement, les 
promulgateurs doivent adresser la mauvaise affectation du capital avec 
des incitatifs d’impôts pour des investissements dans une entreprise avec 
une croissance réduite. Deuxièmement, la faible gouvernance des titres 
devrait être adressée en imposant les structures de gouvernance par 
défaut semblables à celles des actionnaires et des sociétés. Troisièmement, 
les investisseurs devraient avoir plus de contrôle sur la politique de 
distribution des fonds de titres à revenu fixe. Quatrièmement, il n’y a pas 
suffisamment d’investisseurs institutionnels dans le marché pour les fonds 
de titres à revenu fixe et, en conséquence, des promulgateurs devraient 
éviter de limiter les investissements institutionnels des fonds de titres à 
revenu fixe. Dernièrement, les régulateurs ont besoin de surveiller de plus 
en plus la conduite des courtiers-concessionnaires et des directeurs de 
fonds mutuels de manière à protéger les épargnants du marketing de 
produits d’investissements qui s’applique qu’à certains des investisseurs. 
Le marketing de fonds mutuels doit être surveillé de manière à éviter  
un surplus de provisions de capitaux d’investissements dans des  
marchés étroits. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
From 2002 through 2004, income trust units were top-selling products in 
the Canadian securities industry.1 Beyond Canadian borders, in contrast, 
investors have not been as enthusiastic with respect to similar structures.2 
Instead, in August 2004, the high-profile initial public offering (IPO) of 
American Seafoods on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) failed 
spectacularly. Similarly, in October 2004, B&G Foods could only raise 
US$261 million against a preliminary target of up to US$560 million.3 In 
 
 
1  As of September 2004, there were 168 income trusts with a market capitalization of more than 
Cdn$90 billion listed on Canadian stock exchanges; see “Full Listing of All Canadian Income 
Trusts”, online: Investcom <http://www.investcom.com/incometrust/incometrust.htm>. In 2002, 
income trust offerings represented 94 per cent of total Canadian listings, decreasing to 80 per cent 
in the first six months of 2003 (study by PricewaterhouseCoopers, cited in The Globe and Mail, 
Report on Business (8 July 2003), cited in Paul Halpern & Oyvind Norli, “Old Wine in New 
Bottles?”, online: Manulife <http://www.manulife.ca/canada/Investments.nsf/LookupFiles/ 
DownloadableFileHeadlines-IncomeTrusts:OldWineinNewBottles/$File/ 
PaulHalpern_CIR_FallIssue.pdf>). In 2003, income trusts represented 40 per cent of total equity 
issues by value; see data reported by BMO Nesbitt Burns, cited in Paul Halpern, Oyvind Norli & 
David Y. Timbrell, “Income Trusts: Viable Financial Instrument or Product of the Economic 
Environment?” (2004), [unpublished, Capital Markets Institute of the University of Toronto]. See 
also Michael R. King, “Income Trusts–Understanding the Issues” (Bank of Canada Working 
Paper 2003-25, September 2003), online: Bank of Canada <http://www.bank-banque-
canada.ca/publications/working.papers/2003/wp03-25.pdf> at 2-3. For online databases on 
income trusts see the Canadian Association of Income Funds (CAIF), online: CAIF 
<http://www.caif.ca>; the Canadian Institute of Public and Private Real Estate Companies 
(CIPPREC)], online: CIPPREC <http://www.cipprec.ca>. 
2  In general, the American capital market is well familiar with high income securities, which exhibit 
characteristics similar to income trusts, such as REIT units and certain forms of limited 
partnership units (e.g. Sunoco Logistics Partners, (see Sunoco Logistics Partners L.P., Annual 
Report for 2001, online: Sunoco Logistics <http://www.sunocologistics.com/docs/ 
10k_2001.pdf>), which has been listed on the NYSE since 8 February 2002). Canadian 
investment banks, however, attempted introducing a functional equivalent to Canadian income 
trusts—so-called income deposit securities (“IDSs”) or enhanced income securities (“EISs”)—to 
American capital markets. IDSs are combinations of debt and equity, using joint-securitization of 
a debt security and a share, resulting in a slightly different formal structure than Canadian income 
trusts. The results have been, at best, mixed. As of October 2004, only two firms had succeeded in 
issuing IDSs (Volume Services America Holdings, Inc., Prospectus, EDGAR File Number: 333-
103169, and B&G Foods Holdings Corp., Prospectus, online: B&G Foods 
<http://www.bgfoods.com>). This is in contrast to the optimistic estimates of the securities 
industry: in April 2004, Craig Farr, Citigroup’s co-head of U.S. equity capital markets, predicted 
offerings of IDSs would raise US$15 billion in 2004. See Brett Cole & David Scanlan, “CIBC 
brings the Income Trust revolution to the U.S.” Financial Post (5 April 2004) FP1. For further 
filings of IDSs and EISs, see American Seafoods Group, Prospectus, online: American Seafoods 
<http://www.americanseafoods.com> and FairPoint Communications, Inc., Prospectus, online: 
FairPoint Communications <http://www.fairpoint.com>. 
3  See Andrew Willis, “Success of B&G Foods trust IPO is that it got done in the U.S.” The Globe 
and Mail (15 October 2004) B12; and “U.S. investors have no appetite for American Seafoods 
IPO”, globeandmail.com (19 August 2004) (noting that at least 18 more IDS issues were lined up 
behind the American Seafoods offering). For the prospectus, see American Seafoods online, ibid. 
(Willis offers a set of explanations, including an unfavourable overall market, the bad “new taste” 
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light of the hard times that income trust equivalents have experienced 
abroad, the remarkable success of income trusts in Canada raises several 
immediate questions and concerns. Why are income trust structures so 
successful in Canada? Are the existence and performance of income trusts 
a temporary phenomenon, or are they based on sound economic factors? 
Are they likely to remain merely a national phenomenon?  
There are two popular and competing answers to these questions. 
First, some commentators believe that Canadian income trusts are a viable 
financial instrument whose success is based on factors idiosyncratic to 
Canadian corporate, trust, and tax law. Second, there are those who hold 
the view that the Canadian income trust phenomenon is an irrational 
development in the Canadian capital markets: a bubble.4 The literature on 
income trusts has predominantly favoured the former position.5 In 
contrast, this article suggests that the latter position is more likely to 
provide a sound explanation for the overwhelming success of income 
trusts in Canada. In order to overcome the bubble characteristics of income 
trusts, and hence allow them to remain viable in the long run, this article 
recommends five regulatory measures, four of which address 
idiosyncrasies of income trusts, and the last of which addresses an issue 
inherent in securities regulation. Promulgators need to address, first, the 
misallocation of capital motivated by tax incentives for investments in 
low-growth businesses; second, weak trust governance and uncertain 
unitholder rights; third, directors’ discretion with respect to distributions; 
and fourth, an insufficient number of institutional investors in the market 
for income trusts. Furthermore, regulators should watch broker-dealers’ 
and mutual fund managers’ conduct more closely. Broker-dealers need to 
                                                                                                    
of the IDS structure “in an income market that already features several flavours of high-yield 
offerings”, and internal problems at American Seafoods.).  
4  The tulip craze of the 17th century in the Netherlands and the South Sea Bubble in England in the 
18th century are clear symbols of market frenzy; see Peter Garber, “Famous First Bubbles” (1990) 
4:2 Journal of Economic Perspectives 35; on the “Tech Bubble” of 1999/2000, see also infra 
note 82. 
5  Halpern, Norli & Timbrell, supra note 1 at 20; Paul D. Hayward, “Income Trusts: A ‘Tax-
Efficient’ Product or the Product of Tax Inefficiency?” (2002) 50 Can. Tax J. 1529 at 1533ff; 
King, supra note 1 at 28; Avery Shenfeld, “The Economic Benefits of Income Trusts” (Paper 
written for CIBC World Markets: Economic Perspectives, 2003), online: CIBC World Markets 
<http://research.cibcwm.com/economic_public/download/incometrust.pdf>; Peter Beck & Simon 
Romano, Canadian Income Funds: Your Complete Guide to Income Trusts, Royalty Trusts and 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (Mississauga: John Wiley, 2004). More critical are Jack Mintz & 
Lalit Aggarwal, “Income Trusts and Shareholder Taxation: Getting It Right” (2003) 
[unpublished], online: CD Howe Institute <http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/income_trusts.pdf> at 23ff 
(an earlier version of a paper published in (2004) 52 Can. Tax J. 3 at 793). 
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be monitored to protect retail investors from the marketing of investment 
products on a broad scale using arguments that respond to the needs of 
some, but not all, investors. Mutual funds need to be monitored in order to 
avoid an over-supply of investment capital in narrow markets. 
The next section of this article provides a general overview of the 
income trust structure. Section III then considers the arguments in favour 
of an income trust investment, maintaining that these arguments are either 
overstated, inconsistent, or apt to mislead retail investors. Section IV 
shows that three characteristics of the American tech bubble in 1999 and 
2000 also exist in the current income trust boom, and that arguments 
positing that bubble phenomena do not exist are based on conditions that 
the current trust boom does not meet. Some firms might nevertheless be 
more beneficial to investors and society if structured as income trusts, as 
compared to maintaining a corporate structure. In order to create a viable 
market in income trust units over the long run, section V therefore 
recommends the implementation of specific regulatory policies with 
respect to what I perceive to be the five core problems of the income trust 
market. Section VI concludes. 
II STRUCTURE OF INCOME TRUSTS 
An income trust structure can be imposed upon interests in real property, 
interests in operating entities, or interests in any active businesses that are 
likely to produce reasonably predictable streams of cash flow. Income 
trust securities, usually in a form termed “units”, represent a beneficial 
interest in the underlying business and entitle the unitholder to a share of 
the distributable cash flows that the business generates.6 Over time, many 
variants of income securities have been developed, some predicated on 
trust law and others developed from the law governing limited 
partnerships. This article pertains to income securities associated with 
entities structured as trusts. Drastically simplified, these trusts adopt a 
three-layer structure, consisting of the operating firm, the trust, and the 
unitholders, as Figure 1 demonstrates.7 
 
 
6  Part 1.2 of National Policy 41-201, “Income Trusts and Other Indirect Offerings”, online: Ontario 
Securities Commission <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca> [NP 41-201]; Halpern, Norli & Timbrell, 
supra note 1 at 7, show that—on a median basis—income trusts pay out 87 per cent of their cash 
flow from operations, as compared to 7 per cent paid by comparable corporations (there is wide 
disparity between individual firms in each category). 
7  King, supra note 1 at 10. In some income trusts, the management of the operating firm is 
delegated to a management company, which historically has consisted of the promoters or 
organizers (i.e., past management) of the income trust (e.g. Inter Pipeline Fund adopted such a 
structure). For further modifications see Mark R. Gillen, “Income Trust Unitholder Liability: 
Risks and Legislative Response” (Paper prepared for the Capital Markets Institute, November 
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Two contracts connect the three layers: a “declaration of trust” or “trust 
indenture” sets out the terms of the trust, and is applicable to all three 
layers; a “note indenture” sets out the terms of the debt and is an 
agreement between the trustee and the operating firm.8 Together these 
documents set out a complex division of functions. The operating firm 
generates the distributable cash that is transferred to the trust as a 
combination of interest, dividends, lease interest or royalty payments, and 
return on equity payments. The trust is a special-purpose entity that is 
created to act as a fiduciary on behalf of the unitholders, and it is typically 
administered by multiple trustees, acting like a board of directors. In order 
to make trust units eligible investments for deferred income plans such as 
RRSPs, the trust is incorporated as a “mutual fund trust” under section 132 
of the Income Tax Act.9 The trust may fulfil five purposes: (1) bundling 
debt, royalties, and equity by securitization into a single “unit”; (2) issuing 
these units; (3) paying out the income generated by the operating firm to 
the unitholders on a monthly or quarterly basis; (4) exercising shareholder 
and creditor rights in the operating entity; and (5) owning the operating 
assets which were formerly owned by the firm. Through their direct 
investment in trust units, unitholders, who are for the most part public 
                                                                                                    
2003) [unpublished], online: Capital Markets Institute <http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/cmi/news/ 
Gillen.pdf> at 4; Beck & Romano, supra note 5. 
8  Gillen, ibid. at 4. 
9  R.S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.), c.1, s. 132 [ITA]. 
Unitholder 
Operating Company 
Income Trust 
Distribution 
Interest, Royalties, Dividends, 
Return of Equity Payments 
Buy Debt and Equity  
in Operating Company 
(from Promoter) 
Buy Units 
Figure 1:      Income Trust Structure
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investors, each hold a beneficial interest in the operating firm. An income 
trust unit represents a share in the combination of debt or royalty interests 
and equity in the entity owning or operating the business.  
III ARGUMENTS FOR INCOME TRUST INVESTMENTS 
Although a broad range of businesses, diverse in their organization and 
operation, have been structured as income trusts, the sell side (promoters, 
investment advisers, and underwriters)10 predominantly develops its 
marketing efforts around five categories of arguments in favour of income 
trusts: identifying unitholders as secured debtholders, tax-based 
arguments, high-cash-return arguments, arguments pertaining to an 
alignment of interests between debtholders and equity holders, and the 
characterization of income trusts as conservative investments. Actual 
prospectuses do not expressly mention these arguments,11 but they have 
become part of common public perceptions of income trusts. Nevertheless, 
these arguments either do not fit all investors, do not adequately address 
the complexity of the specific trust structure, or do not hold true when one 
looks at the underlying business of the trust.  
Debt Security? 
From a legal point of view, a trust unit represents an interest in both debt 
and equity. Nevertheless, the public seems to perceive income trust units 
primarily as bond-like.12 Four factors might explain the public perception. 
First, income trust units are said to yield stable cash flows for investors. 
Second, Canadian income trusts and bond issuances are both governed by 
trust (common) law.13 Thus there are similarities in the facial form of 
 
 
10  As defined in s. 1 of the Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5. Readers might perceive the following 
arguments as “straw man” arguments, meaning that I appear to be attributing statements about 
income trusts to the sell side for the purpose of critiquing them; of course, sell side representatives 
are likely to deny that they have ever raised some or all of the following marketing arguments. It 
must be considered, though, that these arguments are, in fact, out there and influence day-to-day 
investor decisions, which I try to indicate in the notes given in the following. It is likely that the 
sell side, at least, does not oppose the errors that investors make when investing in income trusts. 
Thus a clarification, for which this article strives, might be useful. 
11  Macquarie Power Fund, Prospectus (30 March 2004) at 83; Osprey Media Income Fund, 
Prospectus (5 March 2004) at 60; Holiday Income Fund, Prospectus (22 March 2003) at 65; Ag 
Growth Income Fund, Prospectus (29 March 2004) at 79; Richards Packaging Income Fund, 
Prospectus (5 March 2004) at 55; all available online: SEDAR <http://www.sedar.com/search/ 
search_form_pc_en.htm>. 
12  Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), “The Ins and Outs of Income Trusts,” online: OSC 
<http://www.investored.ca/en/library/osc/ins_outs_of_income_trusts.htm>. 
13  In contrast, Delaware enacted the Business Trust Act in 1988, renamed the Delaware Statutory 
Trust Act in 2002, with the intention of increasing the utility of the statutory trust in modern 
 University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review Vol. 63(1) 
Copyright © 2005. University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review. All rights reserved. 
54
governing agreements, as well as common terminology. For example, 
written agreements called “indentures” or “deeds of trust” are used to 
structure both income trusts and the relationship between a borrower 
corporation and a trust company in a bond issuance (in which a 
corporation appoints a trust company to represent the bond-holders).14 
These commonalities in the form and description of agreements may 
confuse public investors, leading them to perceive income trust units as 
secured debt. Third, rating agencies rate the pay-out stability of many 
income trusts. Rating agencies usually evaluate bond ratings, but not 
equity investments,15 thus giving uninformed investors the impression that 
income trust units are more akin to debt than to equity. Fourth, interest and 
royalty payments to a trust are considered to be a cost of doing business, 
and are thereby fully tax-deductible by the operating company. Because 
payments from a trust to unitholders are treated as debt payments for the 
narrow purposes of tax law, public investors may think trust units have 
debt rather than equity characteristics.16  
Despite the legal form of the agreement between a trust and its related 
operating firm, an investment at the level of the unitholder does not 
necessarily constitute a debt investment. Instead, a regular debt investment 
differs from an income trust unit in four significant respects. First, the 
unitholders have a beneficial interest in both the debt and the equity of the 
underlying operating entity. Second, the level of debt owed to unitholders 
and the interest rates for this debt are not contingent on market 
mechanisms—that is, they do not directly result from the profits of 
operating activities but are deliberately fixed to accord with tax law 
restraints. Third, under a trust indenture, unitholders cannot enforce 
distribution promises. Even though trustees can enforce debt obligations 
owed to them by the operating company to fund distribution promises, the 
apparent reality is that trustees, acting in the best interests of unitholders, 
usually decide that enforcement is not appropriate. If trustees were to 
repeatedly enforce distributions in circumstances of financial difficulty, 
                                                                                                    
financing transactions. Singapore plans to enact a statutory scheme for trusts as well; see 
Consultation Paper on Business Trusts Regulation (11 August, 2004), online 
<http://www.mas.gov.sg/masmcm/bin/pt1Reports_and_Consultation_Papers.htm>. 
14  Stephen A. Ross, Randolph A. Westerfield & Jeffrey Jaffe, Corporate Finance: International 
Edition, 5th ed. (Boston: Irwin McGraw-Hill, 1999) at 319, 353, 526ff. 
15  Halpern, Norli & Timbrell, supra note 1 at 22. As of September 2004, 75 trusts listed at the TSX 
were subject to ratings by Dominion Bond Rating Service and Standard & Poor’s. See Rob 
Carrick, “Stability ratings help spot bad tomatoes,” The Globe and Mail (4 September 2004), 
online: Globe Investor <http://www.globeinvestor.com>. 
16  Ross, Westerfield & Jaffe, supra note 14 at 351. 
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the operating company might become insolvent, permanently harming the 
value of recovery to the unitholders. Fourth, many note indentures 
subordinate unitholders’ claims in the operating company (the debt whose 
rights are administered by trustees) to all other third party debt. 
Unitholders, the last in line when the operating firm goes bankrupt, are 
effectively the residual claimants to the overall cash flow of the operating 
entity. In conclusion, for these four reasons, unit-investors, in substance, 
purchase an equity security.17 
Among sophisticated investors, it is well known that corporations are 
very adept at creating hybrid securities that have the risk structure of 
equity but are legally characterized as and called debt in order to obtain 
beneficial tax deductions. Therefore, legally branding a security as debt 
should not be sufficient to obscure a sophisticated investor’s view of the 
real nature of an investment. The situation is likely different with respect 
to retail investors, who are more likely to be confused by the name or form 
of a security.  
Tax Advantages? 
Under Canadian tax law, interest and royalty payments are tax deductible 
from the profits of a business.18 For trusts, a return on equity is not taxed 
at the investor level at the time an investor receives cash flow from the 
investment. Therefore, income trusts might yield tax advantages. Income 
trust marketing focuses on these tax advantages by claiming that the 
overall tax burden of a unitholder is less than that of a shareholder or 
bondholder at the same level of investment.19 The claim, however, is 
highly contested. Experts have fiercely debated whether there is an overall 
tax advantage to income trusts.20 To evaluate the claim of income trust 
 
 
17  Halpern, Norli & Timbrell, supra note 1 at 6. Under some trust indentures, however, unitholders 
are ahead of trade creditors. 
18  American IDSs are unlikely to yield tax advantages. See e.g. the announcement on the AMEX 
website: “IDSs, in general, offer unique features and benefits: Designed to pay monthly income; 
Designed to distribute nearly all free cash flow; Designed for issuers with mature, relatively stable 
businesses.” (online: AMEX <http://www.amex.com/?href=/equities/IDS_main.htm>). The US 
tax problems are summarized by Cleary Gottlieb LLP, “U.S. Federal Income Tax Issues Related 
to Income Deposit Securities” (2004), online: Cleary Gottlieb <http://www.cgsh.com/files/ 
tbl_s5096AlertMemoranda/FileUpload5741/124/2-2004.pdf>. 
19  See e.g. K. K. Choong, “Income Trusts–A Betty Way To Produce Fixed Income”, online: 
Investcom <http://www.investcom.com/incometrust/kkchoong.htm>; see also OSC, supra note 12 
(particularly the sections titled “Why use an income trust rather than a conventional IPO?” and 
“Tax Treatment and Regulation”). 
20  Four studies deal with the tax effects of income trust investments. Mintz & Aggarwal, supra note 
5 at 4, hold that the tax gain of income trusts for investors might add up to between Cdn$500 and 
$700 million per year. HLB Decision Economics Inc., “Risk Analysis of Tax Revenue 
Implications of Income Trusts” (11 March 2004), online: CIPPREC <http://www.cipprec.ca/ 
PDFs/HLB%20Final%20Report_Mar.11,2004.pdf> at 2-3 holds that income trust-related tax 
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marketers and assess it in light of this debate, a closer look at the tax 
structure is required. 
Tax Efficiency at the Level of the Firm 
Corporations are subject to income and capital taxation. Payments for the 
use of borrowed capital are tax deductible: debt financing charges and 
royalty payments are netted from gross income before the corporate tax 
rate is applied. In contrast, payments for the use of share capital or equity 
financing are not tax deductible at the level of the firm: dividends must be 
paid out from the corporation’s after-tax earnings.21 Thus, by structuring 
the capital supplied by a trust to an operating business in the legal form of 
debt, earnings that flow through as distributions to unitholders are tax 
deductible at the level of the business. As a result, there is support for the 
argument that investing in a business through an income trust as opposed 
to direct shareholdings reduces the total tax paid on the investment 
return.22 If a trust pays out all taxable income received from its operating 
business to the trust’s unitholders (as it typically does), then neither the 
operating business nor the trust pay taxes.23 Consequently, income  
trusts are established to take advantage of single entity taxation at the 
unitholder level.24  
Tax Efficiency at the Level of the Investor? 
Income trusts declare distributions either as returns of capital, as interest, 
as income payments on units held by a unitholder, or as dividends. 
Redistributing part of an investor’s capital (return of capital) results in a 
                                                                                                    
losses to governments between 2002 and 2004 are most likely to total $217 million (with a 10 per 
cent range between +$72 million and –$560 million), taking into account taxes paid by 
unitholders for investments not held in tax shelters. Personal income tax on deferred income 
earned by unitholders is likely to add up to $268 million, which is roughly equal to what 
governments are forgoing in taxes today. The study was commissioned by CAIF and CIPPREC. 
For further estimates see Hayward, supra note 5 at 18 and Shenfeld, supra note 5 at 6. 
21  ITA, supra note 9, s. 20(1)(c) (interest deductibility) and (e) (financing expenses). 
22  Unless the operating firm holds significant capital, it also will not pay significant capital-stock 
taxes. Capital-stock taxes are usually assessed as a percentage of the par or assigned value of a 
firm’s capital stock. However, capital-stock taxes are generally quite modest and do not constitute 
a core issue when considering the tax advantages associated with income trusts. 
23  Otherwise, it will have to pay the highest personal income tax rate (see s. 104 (6) of the ITA, supra 
note 9), which is perceived as a “penalty”. See Jack Mintz, “Looking for the best return”, The 
Globe and Mail (30 March 2004) A15. 
24  Halpern, Norli & Timbrell, supra note 1 at 5. 
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tax deferral: return of capital does not accrue to computable income at the 
time that it is received by an investor.25 Instead, a return of capital reduces, 
on paper (for tax purposes), a purchaser’s original cost (adjusted capital 
cost) of acquiring ownership. Because taxable capital gains are equivalent 
to the proceeds of selling a security minus this adjusted cost base, a 
decrease in the cost base from a return of capital leads to an increase in an 
investor’s taxable capital gain on the eventual sale of the securities. 
Although it is uncontested that some tax savings exist with the preferential 
treatment of capital gains (through a lower inclusion rate), the additional 
and often-claimed tax deferral benefit is contestable. Due to the time value 
of money, tax deferrals can be advantageous, but whether a tax deferral is 
always advantageous really depends on the specific investor. Two 
examples explain this contention. First: investor A is 60 years old, and will 
retire in a few years. He has reached his highest annual income in his life. 
Lower income in retirement is likely to cause lower marginal tax rates to 
apply to him. Deferring income is preferable to A, since this income will 
be taxed at a lower overall rate in the future. Second: investor B is 40 
years old. She is likely to reach her highest annual income at the age of 60. 
Unless invested in a Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP), which 
benefits from an income tax credit, deferring income might not be 
advantageous to investor B. If received today, the income will be subject 
to lower marginal tax rates than it would were it received in the future, 
assuming that investor B is progressively earning more income in 
subsequent years. These very simple examples do not take into account 
many other factors, such as the costs of maintaining the liquidity of some 
assets to prepare for unexpected expenses, family, and cross-relationships 
with other investments. They do, however, demonstrate that tax deferral is 
not a universally applicable argument in marketing income trust units.  
An indirect benefit to investors may be associated with the tax 
characterization of income trusts: because a trust’s operating firm benefits 
from lower taxation compared to ordinary corporations with direct 
shareholders and higher equity-to-debt ratios, there is comparatively more 
liquidity in the operating firm, which should result in relatively higher 
security or unit prices. A price increase based on having more cash in the 
firm is, however, unlikely, because income trusts are designed to pay out 
to unitholders all available cash at the level of the operating firm and the 
trust. Despite this, such a price increase could theoretically result from a 
split between cash flow and profits, as is the case with depreciation.26 If, 
 
 
25  King, supra note 1 at 12-13. 
26  When a firm invests in a good, the cash payment might differ from the depreciation rate, with an 
effect on profits as follows: assume that a firm buys real estate for $100, and finances the purchase 
from its cash flow. In its books, however, the real estate might be depreciated for the next twenty 
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however, all assets are owned by a trust, as in Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REITs), there is nothing to depreciate in the operating firm. Thus, 
such a price increase is unlikely to materialize in practice. 
Distributions in the legal form of interest and income payments to 
unitholders can either be compared with interest payments to bondholders 
or with dividends paid to ordinary shareholders. Compared with bonds, 
there is no tax advantage. However, it has been argued that income trust 
units are substantively equity, and must therefore be compared with 
dividends. As a means of providing equal levels of taxation for dividends 
and interests or royalty payments, section 121 of the ITA provides a tax 
credit for dividends.27 The provisions of the ITA dealing with the taxation 
of dividends are intended to avoid the incidence of double taxation, at least 
to some degree. Thus, the taxation of a dividend at the investor level is 
designed to take into account the fact that the corporation which is paying 
the dividend has already paid tax on that money. Integration under the 
ITA, however, is incomplete in most cases. This is due to the fact that the 
tax credit is based on the small business corporate income tax rate of about 
23 per cent. Most corporations pay higher income taxes of, on average, 45 
per cent. Without being structured as an income trust, an operating firm 
would have to pay higher taxes on its dividends than can be regained by 
investors through their tax credits, leaving a net loss to the investors. By 
avoiding tax at the level of the operating business, Canadian income trusts 
can eliminate the increased tax burden that results from an incomplete 
integration of corporate and personal income taxes.28 
Do these tax advantages for tax-exempt entities, however, create 
overall value for investors? The average underwriters’ and legal fees for 
corporate IPOs in Canada in the years 1997 through 1999 was 11.78 per 
cent, and the weighted average, which measures IPOs proportionally to the 
size of the offering, was 7.19 per cent. The average total direct cost of an 
IPO in 1997 through 1999 was 7.28 per cent for large issues (Cdn$100 to 
                                                                                                    
years at five per cent per annum. In year one, the profit will be reduced by $5, although the cash is 
reduced by $100. In the following years, the investment will reduce profit by $5, but the cash will 
not be reduced any more. Thus, the income trust may pay out a higher amount of cash to investors 
than profits would allow for. The same effect is possible in the other direction, e.g. a good might 
be depreciated to 100 per cent in the year of investment, and financed over, say, five years. 
Contingent on investment policy, a separation of cash flow from profits might therefore account 
for a higher or lower payout by the firm. 
27  Supra note 9. 
28  Mintz & Aggarwal, supra note 5 at 3. 
Winter 2005 The Need for Regulating Income Trusts 
Copyright © 2005. University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review. All rights reserved. 
59
$200 million) and 15.98 per cent for small issues (Cdn$1 to $10 million).29 
Data on underwriters’ and legal fees for income trust issues have not been 
published, but the figures are likely to be a little higher for income trust 
issues than for corporate IPOs, since income trust issues require a 
complicated restructuring in advance of an offering. Thus, underwriters’ 
and legal fees for income trust issues are likely to add up to approximately 
seven to ten per cent of an overall issue. In 2003, income trust issues 
raised a total of approximately Cdn$13.5 billion in capital,30 which, 
according to my estimates, would add up to consultant fees of about 
Cdn$0.95 to $1.35 billion.31 In contrast, previous studies analysing the tax 
effects of income trusts have assumed a median positive tax effect, at the 
level of investors, of between Cdn$500 and 700 million.32 In order to 
calculate the net value of tax savings realized by an individual investing in 
income trusts, one cannot simply subtract the latter figures from the 
former, because the tax effect includes institutional and retail investors. 
Furthermore, corporations, though more seldom than income trusts, also 
require external financing from capital markets, and thus will also pay 
some consultant fees. The figures indicate, however, that tax effects must 
be significant in magnitude to offset the general cost effects that the 
complex structure of income trusts imposes on investors’ money.  
Long Term Investment Argument? 
If there is ultimately some tax advantage to investing in income trusts, 
investing on the basis of that tax advantage in the long term will be risky. 
If an investment concept is really tax effective, governments may change 
tax laws for the very same reason, as a government will act to protect its 
revenues and adhere to the principle of equitable taxation. If an overall tax 
leakage were likely, one would assume that the government would fill the 
tax loophole by, for example, qualifying distributions paid to unitholders 
as dividends.33 In fact, the Canadian federal government did attempt to 
stop some tax leakage from income trusts when it put forward a proposal 
to limit the overall amount of income trust units that were permitted to be 
 
 
29  Cécile Carpentier et al., “Initial Public Offerings: Status, Flaws and Dysfunction” (Paper prepared 
for Industry Canada, April 2003) [unpublished], online: Strategies.gc.ca <http://www.strategis.ic. 
gc.ca/epic/internet/insbrp-rppe.nsf/vwapj/PrimaryIssues_e.pdf/$FILE/PrimaryIssues_e.pdf> at 27. 
30  Andrew Willis & Elizabeth Church, “Trust mania spurs quality concerns” The Globe and Mail (2 
February 2004) B1. 
31  The expenses for continuous listings, which is likely to add up to about Cdn$0.5 million per trust, 
are excluded. 
32  See Mintz & Aggarwal, supra note 5. 
33  From a tax perspective, all distributions would then be treated as dividends. This handling is likely 
under s. 42 of the German Abgabenordnung (BGBI. I, S. 613; 1977 I, S.269) (the German taxation 
statute). 
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held by an institutional tax-exempt entity, such as a pension plan.34 The 
proposal, however, was subsequently withdrawn. It is noteworthy that the 
federal budget proposal did not cap RRSP investments in income trusts, 
but it is unlikely that the different treatment of institutional and individual 
investors results from greater likelihood of tax leakage at the level of the 
institutional investor. Rather, political considerations come into play: retail 
investors are a strong constituency in federal elections. The core point that 
I have raised in this section, however, which is that tax efficiency is not a 
good investment argument for long term investments, is still valid because 
tax law has been, and will always remain, subject to abrupt legislative, 
administrative and political changes.  
Intermediate Results 
The argument that income trusts are not advantageous to investors for tax 
reasons, as compared to shares and bonds, is not true with respect to all 
investors. Instead, tax exempt institutional investors and investors in 
RRSPs do indeed realize net tax savings. Generally, no tax on an operating 
corporation’s distributable earnings will be paid at the corporate level, and 
no tax will be paid at the investor level either. In contrast, corporate 
earnings received in the form of dividends will be taxed at the corporate 
level. As explained above, the tax advantage in income trusts results from 
the inadequate integration of corporate and personal income taxes. 
Whether this will be true in the future, and whether these advantages 
presently offset the additional costs of restructuring businesses into 
income trusts, is unclear. Actual income trust prospectuses seem to refrain 
from utilizing tax arguments to promote the income trust.35 On the other 
hand, the prospectuses also seem to lack a comparison of the tax 
consequences of investing in shares or bonds with those of investing in 
income trust units. In a recent opinion issued to the Canadian Securities 
 
 
34  In the Federal budget proposal of 23 March 2004, a pension plan is prohibited from owning more 
than one per cent of the book value of its assets as business trusts and from owning more than five 
per cent of any single business trust. There is no cap on pension-plan holdings in real estate 
investments or royalty trusts. See Mintz, supra note 23. The retreat came shortly before the federal 
elections. See Heather Scoffield & Elizabeth Church, “Goodale backtracks on trust cap move” 
The Globe and Mail (14 May 2004) B1. See also James Pierlot, “Federal Government Retreats on 
Income Trusts,” Canadian Employment Benefits and Pension Guide no. 523 (June 2004) at 1-3. 
35  Macquarie Power Fund, Prospectus (30 March 2004) at 83; Osprey Media Income Fund, 
Prospectus (5 March 2004) at 60; Holiday Income Fund, Prospectus (22 March 2003) at 65; 
Ag Growth Income Fund, Prospectus (29 March 2004) at 79; Richards Packaging Income Fund, 
Prospectus (5 March 2004) at 55; all supra note 11. 
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Administrators (CSA), the Canadian Association of Income Funds (CAIF) 
did not support this kind of disclosure.36  
As with the characterization of income trust units as debt-like, the 
characterization of tax treatment as advantageous is not necessarily wrong, 
but the tax arguments are unlikely to fit all investors. While sophisticated 
investors are likely capable of sorting the various claims and assessing the 
real value of tax effects, the marketing of income trusts as tax-saving 
investments might mislead retail investors.  
High Cash Returns? 
The Paradox of High and Stable Cash Flows 
With the yields for government bonds at or close to their all time low,37 
income trust units seem to be an appealing alternative that—as the sell 
side states—generates a stable and high yield.38 According to the efficient 
market hypothesis, there is no ‘free lunch at the markets’.39 As long as 
there are efficient capital markets, security prices reflect all available 
information about the underlying value of the business and its risk 
exposure.40 An extraordinary return relative to a broad market index will 
therefore either be immediately consumed by higher unit prices, or 
explained as reflecting the particular risk of an investment. To the same 
 
 
36  CAIF, Press Release, “The Canadian Association of Income Funds Announces Comments and 
Support for National Instrument 41-201 Issued on October 24th by the Canadian Securities 
Administrators” (27 November 2003), online: CAIF <http://www.caif.ca/content/ 
CAIF_PressRelease3_031127.htm> at comments 2.5 and 5.1. 
37  Jeffrey Rubin, “Why feds clamped down on income trusts” The Globe and Mail (29 March 
2004) B7. 
38  The average pre-tax overall return of cash distributions from income trusts in 2002 was between 
9.5 per cent and 21.4 per cent.; See King, supra note 1 at 14. On the sell side, see Integrated 
Corporate Relations, Inc., “White Paper on IDS” (2003), online: Integrated Corporate Relations 
<http://www.icr-online.com/images/ICR_WHITE_PAPER_ON_IDS.pdf> [ICR, “White Paper”] 
at 5 (“To counter the disappointing returns of the broader market and in response to the higher 
importance placed on cash generation of late, issuers are able to emphasize predictability and 
distribution merits.”). See also Investcom, “Income Trusts,” online: Investcom 
<http://www.investcom.com/incometrust/whatis.htm> (“The projected life of distributions and the 
sustainability of distribution levels tend to vary with the nature of the business underlying the 
income trust. Earnings from the business are distributed to investors each month or quarter, with 
yield ranging anything from 6 to 20 per cent a year. (The higher the yield, the riskier the trust.)”); 
Choong, supra note 19 (“If you want fixed income but you are not happy with the recent low 
return generated by investment such as bonds, T-bills and money market, then you may want to 
consider investing in an Income Trust.”). 
39  Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance: International Version, 
6th ed. (Boston: Irwin McGraw-Hill, 2000) at 354-376; Ross, Westerfield & Jaffe, supra note 14 
at 319ff. 
40  This is independent of the form or the hypothesis (weak, semi-strong, or strong form) one 
maintains. See ibid. Exceptions might result from irrational investor behaviour; see 
“Overoptimistic, Retail-Driven Market”, below at 87. 
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extent that the risk increases, the predictability of cash returns decreases. 
The obvious solution (to the sophisticated investor) to the marketing 
paradox is twofold. Either there are no efficient markets, or there are no 
extraordinarily stable and high-yield cash flows.41 
Debt as Discipline? 
Another way of understanding the marketing of income trusts as ‘high and 
stable cash flows’ is to see the cash flow as high and stable when 
compared to corporations. In the income trust structure, an operating firm 
typically has comparatively more debt than does an ordinary business with 
a similarly sized capital stock. This heavier debt load (owing to the trust) 
obligates corporate management to consistently generate higher cash flows 
than would be necessary for an ordinary corporation in order to make 
substantial and regular interest payments.42 Notwithstanding taxes and 
managerial agency costs, under the efficient market hypothesis it should 
not matter whether a firm accumulates and reinvests profits or whether it 
pays out the cash to investors, as long as the firm has sufficient investment 
opportunities with positive net present value. The advantage of income 
trusts is then merely the ‘service’ they provide to the investor. While 
corporations accumulate a large amount of their returns within the firm 
and investors must sell their shares in order to realize these returns, 
income trust investors receive their returns regularly. One might perceive 
this as a more comfortable scenario and, hence, as a valid reason to invest. 
However, this ‘pay-out service’ by income trusts is not provided for free, 
since payments generate transaction costs that are likely to increase as the 
number of transactions (namely pay-outs) increases. Thus, benefits of the 
pay-out service, such as a reduction in agency costs through a disciplinary 
effect on management or a regular return of cash into the hands of security 
holders, must be weighed against the high transaction costs incurred to 
provide this service. The remainder of this section deals with the question 
of whether managerial agency cost considerations can justify an income 
trust investment.  
Income trusts are designed to distribute nearly all of a business’s free 
cash flow to investors on a monthly or quarterly basis. An operating firm 
signals its intention to pay out by issuing high-yield bonds to the trust, or 
 
 
41  The OSC holds that the common perception is different. OSC, supra note 12 (“Despite a common 
perception to the contrary, Income Trusts are not fixed-income investments and returns are not 
assured. They are not suitable investments for everyone.”). 
42  Halpern, Norli & Timbrell, supra note 1 at 7, show that trusts pay out 87 per cent of their cash 
flow from operations, as compared to 7 per cent for corporations (there is wide disparity between 
individual firms in each category). 
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by signing contracts with the trustees that secure an equivalent effect on its 
cash flow. Management thereby theoretically gives up the discretion that it 
has with respect to dividends. At first glance, it thus seems probable that 
income trusts increase spending discipline and diminish managerial 
agency costs at the level of the firm,43 which commonly occur either as 
managerial stealing or shirking.44 At second glance, however, it is unlikely 
that managers of an operating firm would be extraordinarily disciplined 
by the formal obligation to pay out high cash flows to investors for three 
reasons: first, the bankruptcy threat is implausible; second, there is only 
weak direct investor influence; and, finally, there exists only periodical 
market control. 
Implausible Bankruptcy Threat 
In the context of Leveraged Buy Outs (LBOs), Michael Jensen contends 
that high leverage could increase managerial efforts to the benefit of all 
shareholders.45 The argument of ‘debt as discipline’ is based on the 
assumption that managers are afraid of a creditor’s commencement of a 
bankruptcy proceeding since bankruptcy is particularly costly to managers, 
due to a lack of diversification. A large portion of the personal financial 
welfare of managers is generally tied to the success of their firms, and they 
stand to lose these amounts in bankruptcy. One could assume that the 
same is true with respect to income trust structures, because, formally, the 
operating firms within the structure are highly leveraged. As Jensen’s 
argument evinces, however, debt will only be likely to effectively 
discipline managers if the bankruptcy threat from creditors is credible. 
Otherwise, managers will have the same leeway as they do in other 
corporations.  
Thus, the analogy to the ‘debt as discipline’ argument will only be 
valid if a bankruptcy threat imposed by unitholders is credible. This is, 
however, unlikely because of legal hurdles and unitholders’ incentives. 
First, although the legal form (debt) might generally signal enforceability, 
 
 
43  Halpern, Norli & Timbrell, supra note 1 at 11. More generally with respect to debt as discipline, 
see Brealey & Myers, supra note 39 at 528; George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, “The Role of 
Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance” (1995) 83 Cal. L.R. 1073. 
44  Edward M. Iacobucci, “A Wise Decision? An Analysis of the Relationship between Corporate 
Ownership Structure and Directors’ and Officers’ Duties” (2002) 36 Can. Bus. L.J. 337 at 343-
346; see also Mark J. Roe, “Corporate Law’s Limits” (2002) 31 J. Legal Stud. 233 at 234-235. 
45  Michael C. Jensen, “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers” (1986) 
76:2 American Economic Review 323 [Jensen, “Agency Costs”]; Michael C. Jensen, “Active 
Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy” (1989) 2:1 Journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance 35; Michael C. Jensen, “The Eclipse of the Public Corporation” Harvard Business 
Review. (September-October 1989), revised 1997 [revision unpublished], revision online: SSRN 
Electronic Library <http://ssrn.com/abstract=146149>. 
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the trust indentures do not contain a guarantee of high distributions.46 
Thus, unitholders have no legal basis for enforcing the promise of high 
distributions.47 In addition, even if unitholders are able to enforce the 
distribution estimate, they would have lower incentives to commence a 
bankruptcy proceeding, as compared to (other) creditors, since shareholder 
and (subordinated) debt-holder rights are combined in the income trust 
units. While a creditor might receive a portion of its investment back when 
commencing a bankruptcy proceeding, it would be unlikely to obtain any 
payment from the liquidation of a firm that has paid out all of its available 
cash. Consequently, unitholders are unlikely to institute bankruptcy 
proceedings.  
One could argue that these observations do not constitute a serious 
concern, given that in the context of corporations, equity holders, to whom 
I compared unitholders, generally refrain from instituting bankruptcy 
proceedings. In income trusts, as in corporations, the bankruptcy threat 
may be exercised by third parties. However, an operating firm is unlikely 
to default on the payment of third party debt, since it has a protective layer 
of subordinated debt owed to the trust on which it can fail without risk. 
The operating firm is thus even less exposed to bankruptcy risk than is an 
ordinary corporation. 
Possibly Weak Direct Investor Influence 
Both trustees and operating firm managers act as agents on behalf of 
unitholders, and the danger of misconduct is inherent in every principal-
agent relationship.48 Investor influence could substitute for the bankruptcy 
threat to discipline the agents—since, at least in a corporation, directors 
and officers risk losing their jobs as a response to shareholder pressure. In 
 
 
46  Macquarie Power Fund, Cover Page: “Although the Fund intends to make distributions of its 
available cash to Unitholders, these cash distributions are not assured.” Identical quotes are found 
in each of the following, unless otherwise indicated: Osprey Media Income Fund, Cover Page 
(with concrete amount of distributions); Holiday Income Fund, Cover Page; Ag Growth Income 
Fund, Cover Page (distributions “to the maximum extent possible” and printed in bold); Richards 
Packaging Income Fund, Cover Page (distributions “to the maximum extent possible” and printed 
in bold); all supra note 11. 
47  They also lack the standing to make such a claim, since the power to enforce contractual rights is 
vested with the trustees. 
48  This is particularly true with respect to trusts. See Robert H Sitkoff, “Trust Law, Corporate Law, 
and Capital Market Efficiency” (2003) 28 J. Corp. L. 565. A short overview of agency theory is 
provided by Ronald J. Daniels, “Must Boards Go Overboard? An Economic Analysis of the 
Effects of Burgeoning Statutory Liability on the Role of Directors in Corporate Governance” 1995 
Can. Bus. L.J. 229 at 237-241; William A. Klein & John C. Coffee Jr., Business Organization and 
Finance: Legal and Economic Principles, 8th ed. (New York: Foundation Press, 2002) at 17-27. 
For a basic discussion of agency problems see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, 
“Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure” (1976) 3 
Journal of Financial Economics 305. 
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income trusts, however, it could be argued that trust law enables income 
trusts to be structured according to what sponsors find beneficial to 
themselves. This can result in a situation in which management is neither 
directly controlled by unitholders, nor by trustees, as the following section 
demonstrates. 
Trust indentures delegate shareholder and creditor rights to trustees 
who, in many cases, are also managers of the operating firm or who may 
instead elect the management. In the latter case, they constitute a 
functional equivalent to boards of directors in corporations. Because the 
legal owner of a trust is the trustee (or trustee firm), unitholders have only 
the rights that the trust indenture vests in them. Pursuant to many trust 
indentures, an operating firm requires the approval of its unitholders only 
for fundamental changes, such as an amendment to its articles or 
memorandum, amalgamation of the operating corporation, and the sale, 
lease, or exchange of corporate assets.49 In rare cases, some trust 
indentures even vest these rights with the trustees.50 Furthermore, 
unitholders are usually empowered to select or remove some or all of the 
trustees, to approve amendments to the trust instrument, and to terminate 
the trust.  
Trust law does not require that investors possess the capacity to 
control trustees, nor does it mandate the independence of trustees.51 
Instead, in many cases, the interests of the trustee and the management are 
intertwined, to the detriment of investors. For example, trustees may 
delegate most, if not all, of their responsibilities and powers to the 
management of the operating firm in order to avoid potential liability.52 
Managers of the operating firm would be trustees of the income trust, and 
as trustees they might be individually indemnified by the trust with respect 
to the discharge of their duties. In this setting, the “market for trustees”53 
does not discipline trustees, because trustees of income trusts do not 
participate in that market. They participate instead in the managerial 
labour market, which is influenced by different considerations. One may 
 
 
49  King, supra note 1 at 22. 
50  See the overview provided by Gillen, supra note 7 at 34-35. For example, the management of 
Inter Pipeline Fund, an income fund structured as a limited partnership, decided upon an 
acquisition of a firm that reflected more than 70 per cent of Inter’s market capitalization without 
the participation of its investors. See Derek DeCloet, “Inter investors have no say: would you sign 
up for a deal like this?” The Globe and Mail (17 September 2004), online: Globe Investor 
<http://www.globeinvestor.com>. 
51  However, the Canadian “Proposed Multilateral Policy 58-101: Disclosure of Corporate 
Governance Practices” (16 January 2004) does mandate the independence of trustees with respect 
to audit committee candidates. 
52  King, supra note 1 at 22-23. Experts, however, hold that this strategy is unlikely to work. 
53  See Triantis & Daniels, supra note 43 at 1090ff. 
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argue that the position of trustees does not differ from that of inside 
directors of a corporation.  
Compared to a shareholder, the position of a unitholder is weaker, for 
two reasons.54 First, the exercise of the unitholder’s power can have only 
an indirect effect, in that it needs to be enforced by the trustee. While 
directors of a corporation might be subject to shareholder suits, unitholders 
of income trusts cannot pursue directors of the operating entity that are not 
at the same time trustees. In this structure, the trust shields the operating 
entity from unitholder activity. Second, as compared to corporate statutes, 
the trust indenture and the management agreement rarely, if ever, provide 
for effective minority rights. For example, there is no equivalent to the 
oppression remedy in the income trust context. 
The above does not suggest that all trusts have governance problems. 
However, the discretion which trust law allows over the choice of income 
trust governance might result in structures that are detrimental to 
investors.55 This is particularly problematic given that income trusts are 
marketed as a product for retail investors who might not understand the 
implications that trust law provides for them. 
Periodic Market Control 
Market forces could, theoretically, substitute for direct investor influence. 
A decision by managers to reduce distributions is likely to be met with a 
unit price decline in the secondary market, which in turn can have a major 
disciplining effect on managers.56 Because all generated cash, save 
maintenance expenditures, is to be paid to unitholders, one could argue 
that income trust structures heighten the underlying firm’s need to raise 
 
 
54  In this respect I do not follow Hayward, supra note 5 at 1545, who states: 
The units have attributes similar to those of ordinary common shares (each carries a 
right to vote, a right to receive distributions of income in the nature of a dividend, 
and a right to receive a pro rata share of the net assets of the issuer in the event of the 
issuer’s termination or winding up). Annual meetings of unitholders must be held at 
which trustees are elected, auditors appointed, and other matters ordinarily 
associated with annual meetings of shareholders voted on. The trustees have rights 
and obligations that explicitly parallel the rights and obligations of directors under 
corporate statutes. 
55  See also the statement by the long-term chairman (and saviour) of Penn West Petroleum that 
he did caution that income trust structures “can be abused”, which the press interpreted as 
a “cryptic comment suggesting there could be a number of trusts whose sins are being hidden 
by the current lofty price environment.” See Deborah Yedlin, “Penn West’s conversion to 
trust marks end of an era” The Globe and Mail (23 August 2004), online: Globe Investor 
<http://www.globeinvestor.com>. 
56  Those who are most severely hit by this disciplining tool are investors who do not sell fast enough 
when the information becomes public that a trust has reduced its distributions. It is likely that a 
significant number of retail investors will belong to the group that is punished, while the sponsors 
who have sold the product to the market will not be harmed immediately. 
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capital in public markets, which in turn results in greater market oversight 
and more discipline of managers.57 “Every time the firm goes to the capital 
market to issue new units,” as Halpern et al. have noted, “it faces more 
intense scrutiny and the expectation of this scrutiny will reduce current 
cash flow waste.”58 In recent years, however, the consistently high demand 
for income trust units relative to supply suggests that there is no such 
intense scrutiny of management decisions, and that unit pricing is 
unresponsive with respect to management distribution decisions; thus the 
proposition that market forces could substitute for direct investor influence 
is cast into doubt.59 Even if market scrutiny does indeed yield a positive 
effect, a minor positive factor would be insufficient to explain the demand. 
In order to justify the high costs associated with the repeated use of the 
capital market, the overall governance of an income trust must be better 
than corporate governance.60  
In corporations, the takeover market imposes disciplining constraints 
on managers. As compared to directors of (other) corporations, managers 
of an income trust operating firm are relatively invulnerable, for two 
reasons. First, since there are no excess financial resources (slack) in the 
firm, an acquirer cannot use the firm’s assets to pay the relatively high 
takeover costs. Second, if the trust indenture vests the power to appoint 
trustees with institutions other than unitholders—something that was more 
common in past, rather than in recent, issues—the fact that an acquirer 
buys relatively powerless trust units, as compared to voting stock, renders 
takeovers unlikely.61 Consequently, while future projects might indeed 
force managers to the market more often, as compared to (other) 
corporations, the disciplining forces on current projects are reduced.  
Information Content of Distributions 
Another argument supporting the existence of increased managerial 
discipline in income trusts could focus on the information contained in the 
distributions: since one can assume that the old owners do not leave a 
dime on the table, and trust units are evaluated on the basis of expected 
 
 
57  The argument is based on Frank H. Easterbrook, “Two Agency Cost Explanations of Dividends” 
(1984) 74 American Economic Review 650. 
58  Halpern, Norli & Timbrell, supra note 1 at 11. 
59  Willis & Church, supra note 30, state that the fund industry collects Cdn$1.2 billion per month, 
much of which is “earmarked for trusts”. Willis and Church expect a supply of $2 billion worth of 
trust offerings in the first quarter of 2004, with $3 billion or more in trust financings in the 
previous three quarters. 
60  Since one can assume that the expenses for an issue of about 10 per cent of the invested money 
are partly offset by tax advantages, the efficiency gain must reach significant levels within one 
business cycle. 
61  See “Possibly Weak Direct Investor Influence”, above at 64. 
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future pay outs, the prospectus is likely to promise the highest cash 
distribution that the underlying business can yield. Thus, ongoing 
distributions might signal that the business is progressing in accordance 
with the (positive) business plan. Investors thereby receive a credible 
signal without incurring monitoring expenses. This could increase the 
overall return on their investments. One could further assume that good 
managers can signal their quality by promising (even) higher distributions, 
thereby subjecting themselves to the greater discipline of having to meet 
the promised obligation.62  
Ongoing distributions are likely to reduce investors’ monitoring costs. 
However, as compared to ordinary corporations with the usual debt-to-
equity capital structure, the argument relying on the information content of 
distributions is inconsistent in two respects. First, as long as a firm pays 
out, the argument disregards that not only the operating business, but also 
third party debt, generates cash flows. At least for a short time, the trust 
and the firm may be able to fill the hole that develops from the incidence 
of insufficient returns of the operating firm through external financing. For 
corporations, accounting rules usually require transparent disclosure to 
public investors about the source of cash flows, whereas for income trusts 
the source of cash flows may not be so readily represented and easily 
determinable. Due to the unclear supervisory structure between trusts and 
their operating firms, commentators predict a deficiency in the disclosure 
and transparency of income trusts relative to corporate entities.63 Income 
trust disclosure focuses on the term “distributable cash-flow”—a term that 
is not (yet) defined by General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 
Furthermore, in the marketing of income trusts a correlation between price 
and expected distributions is used to determine and account for unit prices. 
Thus “any increase in distributable cash is considered to be good,”64 
wherever it may come from at the very moment that it is paid out. In 
general, promulgators have not clarified the answer to the question of 
which disclosure rules apply to income trusts and to what extent. The new 
National Policy on Income Trusts and Other Direct Offerings65 prescribes 
reconciliation to the GAAP, a measure that might help clarify the issue. 
However, the National Policy has not yet been universally adopted. 
Furthermore, uncertainty is likely to remain among retail investors, given 
the incomparability of different figures provided by different issuers. 
 
 
62  This argument is based on Jensen, “Agency Costs”, supra note 45 at 324. 
63  S.I. Erlichman, “Income Trusts: Some Legal Considerations” (Speech delivered to the National 
Summit on Income Trusts, Toronto, 25-26 November 2002) cited in King, supra note 1 at 22; see 
also King, supra note 1 at 23. 
64  Halpern, Norli & Timbrell, supra note 1 at 10. 
65  NP 41-201, supra note 6 at 2.5. 
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Although Alberta has made changes to its Securities Act to harmonize the 
rules pertaining to trust disclosure with corporate disclosure,66 there is 
arguably a lack of policy or regulation for the transparent disclosure of 
cash flow sources in income trusts. This might disadvantage public 
investors and outweigh the benefit that distributions may provide in 
monitoring management and reducing agency costs. 
Second, if a firm reduces its distributions, the argument about 
distribution information disciplining management will be even less 
convincing: it does not logically follow from the premise of management 
reducing distributions that the present management is deficient. As in 
every business, idiosyncratic risks might cause a reduced cash flow.67 
Once the cash flow is reduced, investors lose their monitoring signal, at 
least in the short term. As well, if distributions are not subsequently reset 
to previous higher levels, investors lose a valuable information signal in 
the future.  
Compared to corporations, a distributions regime results in a 
deficiency of information about management activity. Investors do not 
receive the forward-looking information that is contained in dividend 
announcements. Corporate managers tend to adopt dividend-smoothing 
behaviour, since they assume that a variable dividend stream will result in 
reduced share prices. Several commentators have noted that dividend 
changes provide information about the management’s belief concerning 
the future prospects of the firm: for example, an increase in dividends is a 
signal from the management of a firm to the market that the firm is 
expected to do well.68 For income trusts, a policy to distribute all free cash 
in the operating company to unitholders means that the carrying forward 
 
 
66  Typically in an income trust structure it is the trust units, rather than the shares of the underlying 
operating entity, that are listed for trading on an exchange. As operating entities are usually not 
reporting issuers, there is no requirement to maintain a public disclosure record regarding their 
business and financial affairs. NP 41-201, ibid., addresses this issue, but has not been adopted. 
Further, its provisions are not mandatory requirements. Thus, Bill 34, the Alberta Income Trusts 
Liability Act, S.A. 2004, c. I-1.5 (Royal Assent, 19 May 2004) clarifies that an underlying 
operating entity in which an income trust holds an interest will be considered to be an affiliate of 
the income trust for the purposes of complying with required continuous disclosure obligations. 
Furthermore, insiders of the underlying operating entity of an income trust, including external 
persons contracted to manage an operating entity, are deemed insiders of the reporting income 
trust issuer. 
67  Although the high transaction costs might prevent management from pursuing some projects, new 
investments are not valid reasons for a reduction of distributions, since the management should go 
to the capital market, if there are projects with positive Net Present Value, rather than relying on 
internal financing. 
68  Merton H. Miller & Kevin Rock, “Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information” (1985) 40 
The Journal of Finance 1031 at 1038ff; Ross, Westerfield & Jaffe, supra note 14 at 478-483. For 
empirical testing of the information content of dividends see Adam S. Koch & Amy X. Sun, 
“Dividend Changes and the Persistence of Past Earnings Changes” (2004) 59 The Journal of 
Finance 2093 (including references to further studies). 
 University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review Vol. 63(1) 
Copyright © 2005. University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review. All rights reserved. 
70
of profits and smoothing of dividends at the corporate level is unlikely. 
Consequently, changes in distribution policy by income trusts can be 
deemed to focus on the short term, rather than the long term, perspective. 
Thus, income trust investors exchange possibly better information about 
the present state of the business for worse information about the future. 
This is a particularly precarious position for investors, since the 
expectation of future earnings motivates the average investor to a greater 
extent than does the present economic reality.69  
There is no simple determination of whether the overall informational 
set with respect to income trusts as opposed to ordinary corporations is 
more or less effective in disciplining management. It generally depends on 
the quality of information that investors can acquire with respect to a 
specific trust, its operating firm, affiliates and relationships to third parties, 
and sophisticated analyses of the disclosure. Retail investors are unlikely 
to invest the time and money required for this sophisticated examination. 
Aligned Interests of Debt and Equity Holders? 
Shareholders have an incentive to gamble their firm’s assets when the firm 
is in the vicinity of bankruptcy: to the extent that equity value has 
declined, “shareholders in financially distressed companies will be 
inclined to engage in risky behaviour in order to increase the option value 
of their equity.”70 In other words, in the vicinity of bankruptcy, equity 
holders are likely to make risky gambles at the expense of creditor 
interests by maximizing the uppermost profit potential of the firm’s assets 
while planning to walk away from the businesses if the gamble fails. If the 
gamble does succeed, the shareholders will benefit. If it fails, the firm will 
go bankrupt and the creditors will pay the costs, by way of a reduced pay-
back as a consequence of both the bad gamble and the bankruptcy costs. 
This conflict of interest between debt- and equity-holders is unlikely to 
emerge if shareholders are also holders of a significant part of the 
corporate debt.71 Income trust structures might signal to third-party 
creditors that the equity-holders are unlikely to support excessively risky 
business strategies and hence might decrease financing costs. However, 
income trusts do not meet the prerequisites of the alignment-of-interests 
argument, since the debt held by a trust is subordinated to all other debt. 
 
 
69  Anders Johansen & Didier Sornette “The Nasdaq crash of April 2000: Yet Another Example of 
Log-Periodicity in a Speculative Bubble Ending in a Crash” (2000) 17 European Physical Journal 
B 319 at 324. 
70  Daniels, supra note 48 at 552-553; Merton H. Miller, “The Wealth Transfers of Bankruptcy: 
Some Illustrative Examples” (1977) 41 Law & Contemp. Probs. 39 at 40-41; Triantis & Daniels, 
supra note 43 at 1100; Brealey & Myers, supra note 39 at 517 (“Risk Shifting: The First Game”). 
71  Jensen, “Agency Costs”, supra note 45 at 325-326. 
Winter 2005 The Need for Regulating Income Trusts 
Copyright © 2005. University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review. All rights reserved. 
71
As noted at the beginning of this article, unitholders are in effect residual 
claimants.72  
Conservative Investment? 
Income trusts are said to be structures for stable, relatively mature 
issuers,73 with “healthy business fundamentals”.74 In the aftermath of the 
tech bubble of 1999 and 2000, income trust promoters emphasize 
characteristics of conservative, low risk investments. From a legal point of 
view, sellers benefit from the fact that maturity and other associated 
attributes are not legally defined; otherwise, potential purchasers might 
ask about which characteristics these attributes are founded upon in 
particular cases.75  
Assuming that income trusts are indeed founded upon low risk 
businesses, unitholders bear three structural risks, which may render the 
label ‘conservative investment’ a poor fit. First, if an operating corporation 
faces no immediate bankruptcy threat, all available cash is distributed. A 
lack of retained earnings and common equity—the typical safety layer in 
ordinary corporations—jeopardizes the operating corporation’s ability to 
adjust to sudden market changes in the future. New issuances of trust 
units, raising cash to deal with market shocks, are expensive, and in a bust 
market such issuances might result in substantial dilution of the old units.  
Second, some income trust issuances seem to be part of a high-risk 
debt-to-equity swap.76 A debt-to-equity swap involves raising cash from an 
issuance of equity securities in order to finance a repurchase of debt that 
usually has unfavourable terms or requires unaffordable servicing charges. 
Investors are well advised to agree on a swap when the risk structure of the 
debt is close to the risk structure of the equity (high-risk debt) and when 
the probability of default on the debt has increased since the debt was first 
acquired. This advice follows from the fact that the swap will decrease 
 
 
72  See “Debt Security?”, above at 53. 
73  Choong, supra note 19; Hayward, supra note 5 at 1549. 
74  ICR, “White Paper”, supra note 38 at 5. 
75  FairPoint Communications, Prospectus, supra note 2, is the 16th largest phone company in the US. 
Although network effects might support the business model, one might doubt whether a firm of 
that size is likely to stand the technology change and increasing competition in the communication 
business. MTS announced that it eventually abstained from restructuring into an income trust for 
that very reason. See MTS, press release (1 April 2004), online: MTS <http://www.mts.mb.ca/ 
news/nr_2004_TSXSupportsMTS.html>. Many investors, however, question whether this reason 
is true. Another income trust leverages the position of the “largest iron ore producer in Canada 
and among 5 largest in the world.” The fund, however, holds only a 7 per cent gross overriding 
royalty and a 15.1 per cent equity stake in the iron producer. 
76  E.g. in August 2003 Standard & Poor’s rating for the $219 million secured bank loan of FairPoint 
Communications was BB. FairPoint Communications, Prospectus, supra note 2. 
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investors’ risk of a total loss (by improving the debtor’s debt-to-equity-
ratio), while at the same time increasing their chances of benefiting from a 
positive turnaround in the business. In the particular market and business 
circumstances of each capital restructuring, however, evaluating the 
adequacy of the conditions of a debt-to-equity swap demands a 
sophisticated analysis of the underlying business.  
Third, income trusts require businesses with low growth and high 
returns. According to a matrix developed by the Boston Consulting Group, 
low-growth high-return businesses are either in the cash cow or in the dog 
period.77 While the latter is the final stage of a business cycle before 
liquidation or new investment, the former might allow many years of 
successful business. Considering the incidence of asymmetric information, 
and assuming that those with the most information are apt to make the best 
decisions,78 managers and long-term investors are likely to make the best 
estimates of (1) whether the firm is in the cash cow or the dog period and 
(2) if the firm is in the cash cow period, how long the period will last. 
Income trust offerings are sales by incumbent investors in the underlying 
business entity. Prospective purchasers in an income trust offering, and 
thus prospective investors in the underlying business entity, attempt to 
interpret sales by incumbents as information about the value of the firm. 
Market analysts have recognized that with respect to young businesses, 
typically not within an income trust structure, sales by incumbents are 
perceived as noisy negative signals about the prospects of the business.79 
Likewise, but for different reasons, with respect to income trusts, sales by 
incumbents should be perceived as a noisy negative signal: it is not 
transparent to prospective investors, especially unsophisticated retail 
investors, what sales by incumbents indicate about the value of the 
underlying business entity—whether it is in the cash cow or the dog 
period. 
Creating a higher risk security is not necessarily a negative scenario. 
Income trust promoters might tailor the attributes of their securities to the 
different needs of different classes of purchasers. Thus, by filling a niche, 
 
 
77  Carl W. Stern & George Stalk, eds., Perspectives on Strategy from The Boston Consulting Group 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1998) at 35, 43, 195ff. 
78  For details, see Dirk Zetzsche, “Aktionärsinformation in der börsennotierten Aktiengesellschaft” 
(“Shareholder Information in Public Corporations”) [forthcoming in 2005], at s. 1. 
79  Price-pressure effects were first denied by M. Scholes, “The Market for Securities: Substitution 
versus Price Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share Prices” (1972) 45:2 Journal of 
Business 179. Later studies, e.g. Donald B. Keim & Ananth Madhavan, “The Upstairs Market for 
Large-Block Transactions: Analysis and Measurement of Price Effects” (1996) 9 Review of 
Financial Studies 1 at 21 (and citing further studies at 1-2), however, demonstrate a rebound effect 
caused by distressed sales of approximately 1.86 per cent for large block trades. Newer studies 
seem to indicate some exceptions: see James Scott & Peter Xu, “Some Insider Sales Are Positive 
Signals” (2004) 60:3 Financial Analysts Journal 44. 
Winter 2005 The Need for Regulating Income Trusts 
Copyright © 2005. University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review. All rights reserved. 
73
income trusts might augment the allocative efficiency of capital markets. 
At the same time, the clear risk structure might increase overall demand, 
through the “advantage of unbundling”.80 If broker-dealers, however, rely 
on low-risk attributes while selling high-risk securities to retail investors, 
they do not further the allocative efficiency of capital markets. Instead, 
they mislead unsophisticated investors. Consequently, an intensified 
regulatory scrutiny with respect to broker-dealers’ marketing behaviour 
is justified. 
Conclusion 
This section has shown that the marketing of income trusts relies on five 
relatively simple considerations: debt security, tax advantages, high cash 
returns, aligned interests, and conservative investment. At a second glance, 
however, these keywords either do not fit all investors, do not adequately 
address the complexity of the specific trust structure, or do not hold true 
when one looks at the underlying business of a trust. While sophisticated 
investors are likely to untie the complicated bundle of arguments, the 
marketing of income trust units is apt to blur the view of retail investors on 
the fundamentals of the underlying business. In light of the complexity of 
income trust units, neutral or good advice by the sell side of the securities 
industry is especially required in order to avoid misunderstandings by 
retail investors.  
IV TECH BUBBLE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INCOME TRUST BOOM 
The complexity of income trust units raises the question of why income 
trusts have become so successful in the retail market, where investors may 
find it difficult to see through the intricate structures and assess the 
fundamental value of the underlying business. One possible explanation 
could be a partial inefficiency of the capital markets,81 as markets 
 
 
80  Klein & Coffee, supra note 48 at 339-340. 
81  See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, “The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency” (1984) 70 
Va. L. Rev. 549 [Gilson & Kraakman, “MOME”], reviewed in a recent set of articles in the 
Journal of Corporate Law: see Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, “The Mechanisms of 
Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias” (2003) 28 J. Corp. L. 715 [Gilson & 
Kraakman, “MOME – the Hindsight Bias”]; Howell E. Jackson, “To What Extent Should 
Individual Investors Rely on the Mechanisms of Market Efficiency: A Preliminary Investigation 
of Dispersion in Investor Returns” (2003) 28 J. Corp. L. 671; Lynn A Stout, “The Mechanisms of 
Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance” (2003) 28 J. Corp. L. 635. See also 
Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Symposium on Bubbles” (1990) 4:2 Journal of Economic Perspectives 13; 
symposium articles include Garber, “First Bubbles”, supra note 4; Robert P. Flood & Robert J. 
Hodrick, “On Testing for Speculative Bubbles” at 85; Robert J. Shiller, “Speculative Prices and 
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experienced, for example, during the tech bubble of 1999 and 2000.82 This 
section compares the income trust boom and the tech bubble, thereby 
revealing some provocative insights.  
During the tech bubble period, the relative pricing of internet stocks 
diverged from the broad market as a whole.83 This divergence developed 
in three major steps. First, a sound economic story was abstracted from the 
businesses on which it was first based. Second, an alignment of interested 
parties supported the abstraction of the story from the underlying 
businesses. Third, an overoptimistic, retail-driven market induced a steep 
rise in stock prices.  
Story-Leverage 
Innovative Story 
First, a bubble requires a compelling story about the extraordinary 
profitability of an investment. This story can be based on a specific 
invention or discovery (the South Sea provides a historical example), a 
product (like tulips), an industry (such as the internet), or other concepts.84  
The story for the tech bubble was based on the internet. Investors 
focused on firms that were young and inexperienced, but innovative in 
their use of computers, the internet, and related high technologies. 
Therefore, firms needed to demonstrate three characteristics: (1) internet-
related, (2) young, and (3) no cash return. As a consequence, firms went 
public at an unprecedented early stage. While in recent years, investment 
                                                                                                    
Popular Models” at 55; Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, “The Noise Trader Approach to 
Finance” at 19; Eugene N. White, “The Stock Market Boom and Crash of 1929 Revisited” at 67. 
82  Thomas Hellmann & Manju Puri, “On the Fundamental Role of Venture Capital” (2002) 87:4 
Economic Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 19; Robert J. Hendershott, “Net Value: 
Wealth Creation (and destruction) during the Internet Boom” (2004) 10:2 Journal of Corporate 
Finance 281; Debra Howcroft, “After the Goldrush: Deconstructing the Myths of the Dot.com 
Market” (2001) 16 Journal of Information Technology 195; Johansen & Sornette, supra note 69; 
Martin Lipton, “The Millennium Bubble and Its Aftermath: Reforming Corporate America and 
Getting Back To Business” (2003) [unpublished], online: SSRN Electronic Library 
<papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=417503>; Eli Ofek & Matthew Richardson, 
“DotCom Mania: The Rise and Fall of Internet Stock Prices” (2003) 58 The Journal of Finance 
1113 [Ofek & Richardson, “DotCom Mania”]; Jay Ritter & Ivo Welch, “A Review of IPO 
Activity, Pricing, and Allocations” (2002) 57 The Journal of Finance 1795. 
83  Eli Ofek & Matthew Richardson, “The Valuation and Market Rationality of Internet Stock Prices” 
(2002) 18 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 265. 
84  Bubbles can occur in all publicly traded assets. Compare the articles in William C. Hunter, George 
G. Kaufman & Michael Pomerleano, eds., Asset Price Bubbles: The Implications for Monetary, 
Regulatory, and International Policies (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), at parts II and III. 
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bankers hesitated to issue shares of firms that did not make any kind of 
profit, in the tech bubble, firms went public that were unlikely to make 
profits for at least two years following the IPO.85 Public investors were 
convinced of the extraordinary profitability of businesses sharing certain 
characteristics, justifying high levels of investment. This was triggered by 
a very limited number of spectacular public offerings, giving rise to the 
perception that the story was indeed founded on sound economic 
reasoning. The triggering event of the tech bubble was the overwhelming 
success of Netscape and other early entrants into the internet boom. These 
firms exhibited high rates of return to investors in the years immediately 
following their IPOs.86 
The income trust boom story relies on the presence of three new 
characters, namely reduced taxes, old and stable businesses, and high cash 
returns. It is thereby a reflex to the tech bubble. While the securitization of 
oil, gas and other natural resources is a traditional phenomenon in (not just 
Canadian) capital markets,87 the adoption of trust structures by other 
businesses is a relatively new phenomenon. The most publicly noticed 
trust offering—and as yet one of the most successful businesses organized 
as an income trust—was the Yellow Pages business trust offering in the 
summer of 2003, which raised close to Cdn$1 billion. In the aftermath of 
the Yellow Pages offering, many other income trusts sold units to 
investors.88 Yellow Pages was thus likely the trigger for the current 
income trust boom. 
Supporting Economic Arguments 
Precipitating a bubble, investors are assumed to arrive at their decisions 
rationally. Consequently, a bubble, defined as a period in which prices are 
overoptimistic and dissolved from the underlying fundamentals of real 
business activity, cannot develop without creditable economic arguments. 
The extraordinary success of the trigger can then give rise to the 
assumption that the supporting arguments are consistent. ‘Bubble 
 
 
85  Lisa DiCarlo, “Five Reasons to Love the Tech Bubble”, (12 April 2001), online: Forbes.com 
<http://www.forbes.com/2001/12/04/1204bubble.html >: “During the heyday of the bubble, words 
like profit, sales, and even business plan, lost their relevance. People invested their life savings in 
stocks that had no business plans and no profits in sight.”  
86  Hendershott, supra note 82 at 292, shows that the market-adjusted return-on-equity invested 
ranges from 36.5 per cent to 94.7 per cent for a sample of dot-coms of the years 1995-1997, until 
the end of 2001. 
87  Compare Charles E. Harrell, James L. Rice III & W. Robert Shearer, “Securitization of Oil, Gas, 
and other Natural Resource Assets: Emerging Financing Techniques” (1997) 52 Bus. Law. 885. 
88  According to Willis & Church, supra note 30, 107 income trusts tapped the market in 2003 (22 
new offerings, and 85 incumbents). In the fourth quarter of 2003, investors purchased trust units 
for more than Cdn$6 billion. 
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arguments’ have the characteristics of good advertising; for instance, the 
sales pitch can be reduced to as few as three selling features that are easily 
disseminated and appealingly coherent.89  
The tech bubble had a striking logic. First, it relied on the economies 
of scale that the internet technology would allow. The sudden and 
extraordinary price increases of internet-related firms reflected the 
market’s enthusiasm for the “seemingly endless possibilities for growth 
that the Internet represented.”90 What mattered was not profitability but 
rather the scope of operations: the volume of sales, or if not sales, then 
simply the volume of website traffic. Many market participants thus held 
that the future potential of internet-related companies could not be 
measured with traditional, fundamental valuation methods based on 
quantified accounting variables such as revenues and cash flows. Second, 
in order to reach the necessary size to exploit the economies of scale, a 
firm needed the dynamics of youthful, visionary managers and employees. 
Third, concerns about managerial slack seemed to be unjustified, since the 
common opinion was that managerial waste in high growth businesses 
would be restrained by a business’s permanent need for cash in order to 
grow its operations.91  
The logic of the income trust boom leverages on the tech bubble 
experience as a reflex. First, cash returns are now predominant, because 
pay-outs discipline managers by imposing liquidity restraints. The tech 
bubble has demonstrated that the opposite—high cash retention and burn 
rates—is not true. Second, established firms are preferable since the tech 
bubble indicated that young firms cannot handle money effectively. Third, 
a business relying on innovation is a business without secured yields for 
investors. It is thus assumed to be better to rely on stated guaranteed 
returns; specifically, predictable tax benefits.92  
Leverage by Other Businesses 
The success of a market story eventually raises public interest and 
stimulates investment in businesses having characteristics similar to those 
 
 
89  They follow the “KISS” concept: “Keep It Smart and Simple”. Some commentators would say 
“Keep It Simple, Stupid”. 
90  Lipton, supra note 82 at 3. 
91  For “rational” and “irrational” arguments of the tech bubble, see Steven N. Kaplan, “Valuation 
and New Economy Firms” in Hunter, Kaufman & Pomerleano, Asset Price Bubbles, supra note 
84 at 391ff. 
92  The comparison highlights another weakness of income trusts. To the same extent that, during the 
tech bubble, overly immature firms were brought to the capital markets (see, for example, Kaplan, 
ibid. at 397), the income trust boom might result in issues by outdated businesses that lack the 
vigour and innovation to withstand competitive pressures over the long term. 
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of the triggering business(es), which in turn motivates other firms to 
attempt to leverage on the story by re-organizing to adopt or imitate those 
characteristics. The fact that the story is sound for the triggering firm, 
however, does not mean that it also fits every other firm in the same 
industry. Furthermore, other entities that are operating different types of 
businesses will also try to leverage on the success of the trigger. By 
recycling the story over and over, the story eventually becomes abstracted 
from the triggering firm and its underlying fundamentals. 
Due to Netscape’s soaring share prices, other businesses leveraged on 
Netscape’s internet story.93 Nearly every firm that had an internet-related 
story profited from the boom. At the peak of the tech bubble, firms only 
needed an internet-related name. This could be achieved by simply adding 
‘.com’ to the end of their name, trademarks, or brands: no internet 
business was required in order to leverage on the internet effect.94 
Investors seemed to forget that there are always winners and losers: not all 
dot-coms could succeed.  
The same effect is currently happening with respect to income trusts. 
While some businesses, in particular energy-based royalty and real estate 
trusts, restructure into income trusts for sound economic reasons, other 
businesses which the income trust structure does not fit have been 
restructuring into income trusts as well.95 If these firms restructure into 
income trusts, they leverage on income trust characteristics, mirroring the 
actions of firms that emerged during the tech bubble by simply changing 
their names into dot-coms without developing an internet-based business. 
If investors merely rely on the income trust ‘brand’, they neglect the 
different economic structures of the underlying businesses to the same 
extent as tech bubble investors who relied on dot-com names: most 
established royalty trusts are wasting businesses, insofar as cash 
distributions have a significant return of capital element and the 
underlying asset is depleted. REIT businesses are similar: a trust owns real 
estate, the value of which is depleted by time, according to the estimated 
time of use. The risk of both businesses is focused on finding customers 
(in marketing activities) and achieving beneficial sale prices for the 
 
 
93  Compare Hendershott, supra note 82 at 282, for data on the return on equity of 441 dot-coms; see 
also Ofek & Richardson, “DotCom Mania”, supra note 82 at 1115-1116 (including data on 400 
internet-related companies). 
94  See Michael J. Cooper, Orlin Dimitrov & P. Raghavendra Rau, “A Rose.com by Any Other 
Name” (2001) 56 The Journal of Finance 2371. See also P. Raghavendra Rau et al., “Managerial 
Actions in Response to a Market Downturn: Valuation Effects of Name Changes in the dot.com 
Decline” Journal of Corporate Finance [forthcoming in 2005]. 
95  “[O]il and gas and real estate trusts…were the original prototypes for Income Trusts….But in 
recent years the trust market has evolved well beyond those sectoral boundaries, becoming in 
many ways a general asset class with representation from all walks of the economy.” Jeffrey 
Rubin, “Why feds clamped down on income trusts” The Globe and Mail (29 March 2004) B7. 
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product, although different factors might influence the sales prices.96 
Distributions are a good indicator for sales success. Efficient monitoring in 
these businesses is thus relatively inexpensive.  
In contrast, other businesses with low growth and steady earnings that 
restructure as income or business trusts bear all kinds of risk, with possibly 
two exceptions. First, research and development risks in business trusts 
will be low if these businesses do not develop new products. Second, 
marketing risks for business trusts are relatively low because these firms 
are often solidly established in the relevant product market. But the same 
risk structure is also associated with corporations that sell established 
products. With respect to risk structure, income trust units are not different 
from any other kind of security insofar as their risk relies on the 
underlying business.97 If firms nevertheless restructure into income trusts, 
they free-ride on investor confidence in the income trust structure, rather 
than relying on the strength of their business. The analogy to the dot-com 
boom is obvious.  
During the tech bubble, only a minority of businesses leveraging on 
the boom characteristics could benefit from the boom in the long run: 
businesses whose operations were well-positioned to enable practical 
integration of the characteristics, like a genuine internet company with a 
sound business plan.98 The same is likely to be true with respect to the 
income trust boom. Some businesses would be better off, given the nature 
of their operations, structured as ordinary corporations rather than as 
income trusts. It follows that in the long run these businesses will probably 
fail under the pressure of competition in the product markets.  
Alignment of Interested Parties 
The second characteristic of the tech bubble was the fact that the interests 
of Private Equity Investors (PEIs), the securities industry, managers, and 
politicians, all of whom benefited from the boom, were remarkably well-
aligned with each other. This convergence of interests offset the market’s 
inherent check mechanisms on overoptimistic pricing. The potential for a 
similar alignment in the current income trust boom could presumably 
illuminate the possible obstacles and opportunities on the horizon. 
 
 
96  For example, overall economic changes affect REITs differently than energy trusts. See Halpern, 
Norli & Timbrell, supra note 1. 
97  OSC, supra note 12, subsection “Risk and Returns”. 
98  Hendershott, supra note 82 at 293. 
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Private Equity Investors [PEI] 
The issuing behaviour of firms significantly varies in hot and cold 
securities markets. If investors are overoptimistic, firms respond by 
issuing equity in a “window of opportunity”.99 If investors are too 
pessimistic, on the other hand, firms avoid external equity financing. 
Firms do not file for IPOs without the consent of pre-issue investors. Thus, 
the phenomenon that firms take advantage of hot issue markets is likely to 
be grounded in the support of PEIs who are interested in high evaluations 
of the shares of companies that they sell to public investors. 
In the tech bubble, the influence of pre-issue investors was mitigated 
by venture capitalists (VCs). Developing in young tech firms the maturity 
necessary for capital market listings requires the input of experienced 
venture capital managers. Although the value-added activities conducted by 
VCs are dependent on their contexts,100 VCs basically offer four kinds of 
value-added services in addition to a broad network: financial expertise, 
strategic and management advice, administrative advice, and marketing 
expertise. Australian data suggests that investors in VC funds place the 
highest value on financial expertise and on strategic and management 
expertise.101 The necessary expertise, however, is very costly to attain. In 
order to become a good venture capital manager, a professional would 
need long years of management experience as well as training on the job. 
VCs are “repositories of useful institutional knowledge”.102 Obviously, 
VCs demand payment for their services that reflects the high value that 
they contribute to a young firm’s development. Venture capital partners 
receive not only hefty management fees, typically between 2 and 2.5 per 
cent of the funds committed, but also a profit share (carry) of about 20 per 
cent.103 At the same time, investors have basically no access to good 
information about the portfolio firm104 nor accurate perceptions of the 
efforts or luck of venture capital managers before a fund is terminated, 
 
 
99  Jay Ritter, “The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings” (1991) 46 The Journal of 
Finance 1 at 3-27; Ritter & Welch, supra note 82 at 1799; this trend is also true with respect to 
Canada, see Carpentier et al., supra note 29 at 15ff. 
100  Douglas Cumming & Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, “Venture Capital Finance and Litigation over the 
Boom and Bust Cycle” (paper written for the Willamette Conference on Venture Capital in 
Portland, 2003) [unpublished]. 
101  Douglas Cumming, Grant Fleming & Jo-Ann Suchard, “Venture Capitalist Value-Added 
Activities, Fundraising and Drawdowns” Journal of Banking & Finance [forthcoming in 2005]. 
102  William A. Sahlman, “The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations” (1990) 
27 Journal of Financial Economics 473 at 500. 
103  Hellmann & Puri, supra note 82 at 22; see also Sahlman, ibid. at 491, who reports that in 88% of 
the funds surveyed the funds are entitled to 20% of the realized gains; the remainder entitle the 
VC to 15 per cent to 30 per cent. 
104  Sahlman, supra note 102 at 492. Ongoing reporting used to be inaccurate, due to the problem of 
evaluating strong growth firms with prospects for future value, but scarce assets in the present. 
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which tempers any active monitoring of VCs by investors. PEIs therefore 
need to trust in the quality and luck of VC fund managers, as suggested by 
their previous failures and successes. 
Eventually, during the tech bubble, the PEIs’ investment in venture 
capital funds did not result in immediate returns as soon as firms went 
public. Rather, until 2002, investments were subject to escrow agreements, 
which prevented old shareholders from selling shares between 6 and 24 
months after an IPO.105 At the expiry date of the escrow, many VCs would 
transfer shares of the investee firm to the investors of the venture capital 
fund as a means of avoiding price effects on the listed shares.106 There is 
evidence, however, that IPO shares during the tech bubble reached their 
peak shortly after the IPO and generally tumbled around the expiration 
date of the lock up period mandated by the escrow agreement.107  
As compared to the tech bubble, the current income trust boom yields 
three advantages for PEIs. First, PEIs yield returns by selling old, existing 
businesses to the market. Thus, PEIs do not need to take on long-lasting 
and highly risky venture capital investments. Furthermore, PEIs do not 
need to pay venture capitalist rates for the development of their firms. Less 
spectacular returns, as compared to ‘home runs’ during the tech bubble,108 
might, however, offset the cost advantage. Second, PEIs can sell their 
shares in income trusts in indirect secondary offerings: “[i]nstead of 
offering their securities directly to the public, the vendors sell their 
interests in the operating entity of units to the public. The income trust 
purchases those interests with proceeds that it raises through its offering of 
units to the public.”109 Therefore, income trust offerings avoid risky and 
 
 
105  National Policy 46-201, “Escrow for Initial Public Offerings”, online: Ontario Securities 
Commission <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca> [NP 46-201], prescribes a standard form for escrow 
agreements (56-x201F1). Pursuant to TSX company manual Pt. III, E, section 1400-419, and the 
TSX Escrow Policy Statement, in TSX company manual, Appendix C, section 1450-051, II, the 
national policy generally applies to all IPOs. Effective 3 October 2002, the Toronto Stock 
Exchange implemented a new escrow policy, exempting issuers that have a market capitalization 
of at least $100 million after concluding an IPO. Companies subject to escrow will have shares 
released as follows: 25 per cent at the listing date; one third of the remaining shares issued after 
six months; half of the remaining shares after a year; and 18 months after the listing date, the 
remaining escrow securities are distributed. 
106  Alon Brav & Paul A. Gompers, “Insider Trading subsequent to Initial Public Offerings: Evidence 
from Expirations of Lock-Up Provisions” (Working Paper, Harvard University, 2002) 
[unpublished], online: SSRN Electronic Library <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=204094>. 
107  Ofek & Richardson, “DotCom Mania”, supra note 82 at 1131ff. hold that the expiration of the 
lock up period may have caused the bubble to burst. 
108  Hendershott, supra note 82 at 292, has listed the return of equity of 441 VC-backed dot-com 
investments from the vintage years 1995 through 1997. In December 2001, at the lowest point of 
dot-com valuations in the aftermath of the bubble, VC-backed firms continued to provide returns 
of capital between 35 per cent and 85 per cent. 
109  NP 41-201, supra note 6, section 1.5. 
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negative effects that could result from information that might influence 
unit prices in the aftermath of an IPO. In addition, small issues (with 
market capitalization of less than Cdn$100 million after concluding the 
IPO) avoid the escrow period to which issues typically are subject.110 
Third, trust law enables PEIs who want to keep their stakes in the firm to 
tailor the governance structure of the income trust in a manner that furthers 
their private interests. The PEIs’ discretion is limited only by the fiduciary 
duties of the trustees, which may, however, be shaped in the trust 
indenture. Because the vendors sell trust units primarily to retail investors, 
PEIs are more likely to get away with a structure from which they 
personally benefit than they would in a market in which institutional 
investors, more knowledgeable and sophisticated, prevail. Finally, income 
trust offerings provide PEIs with opportunities to restructure debt as 
securities with an equity-like risk structure. Debt-to-equity swaps usually 
require a significant discount on the share price as compared to the bond’s 
nominal value, because shareholders accept higher risks than bondholders. 
In income trusts, however, investors do not seem to discount the value of 
the overall business when former debt is swapped for quasi-equity and is 
issued as an income trust unit. There might be a coherent explanation for 
this phenomenon. If the risk structure of former debt is similar to the risk 
structure of equity then financial inducement in the form of a discount on 
the equity price is not necessary to compensate for differential risks. That 
will be true if the debt is subordinated or has the characteristic of junk 
bonds. Some income trusts have indeed been heavily indebted before their 
debt-to-equity swap.111  
Consequently, PEIs are likely to benefit from the current income trust 
boom even more than from the tech bubble. 
The Wall Street / Bay Street Industry 
Scholars have just begun to analyze the role of financial consultants during 
the tech bubble.112 However, research has yielded some conspicuous 
results: in order to bring internet-related companies to public markets and 
to cash in the virtually guaranteed profits that hot IPOs presented, 
underwriters chose both legal and illegal means. Financial and legal 
 
 
110  NP 46-201, supra note 105. 
111  Compare the proposed transaction with respect to FairPoint Communications, supra note 75. 
112  See e.g. Daniel J. Bradley, Bradford D. Jordan, and Jay R. Ritter, “The Quiet Period Goes Out 
with a Bang” (2003) 58 The Journal of Finance 1; John C. Coffee, “Understanding Enron: It’s 
About the Gatekeepers, Stupid” (2002) 57 Bus. Law. 1403; Cumming & MacIntosh, supra 
note 100. 
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consultants are likely to have influenced the pricing of many IPOs,113 IPO 
allocations,114 and after-IPO support.115  
First, it must be emphasized that there is no evidence that Bay Street 
currently benefits from illegal activities in income trusts. However, the 
incentive structure is apt to facilitate activities that may harm investors. It 
is argued by some that Bay Street benefits from hot issue markets simply 
by conducting more business:  
Underwriters encourage more firms to go public when public 
valuations turn out to be higher than expected and…underwriters 
discourage firms from filing or proceeding with an offering when 
public allocations turn out to be lower than expected.116 
The income financial consultants receive for particular deals is generally 
contingent on the size of the issue. The income consists of a fixed 
percentage fee, as well as the profit from exercising green shoe options.117 
Legal consultants bill by the hour, and hence are unlikely to profit directly 
from an overoptimistic pricing of a share issue. They can indirectly profit 
from a boom, however, since there is simply more work to do. 
Two characteristics of income trusts render the current income trust 
boom even more favourable to the financial industry than the tech bubble. 
First, income trusts are much more complicated structures than are 
corporations. Consultants are likely to benefit from the complexity of the 
 
 
113  Ritter & Welch, supra note 82 at 1803ff. See especially 1810. 
114  Ekkehart Boehmer & Raymond P.H. Fishe, “Who Receives IPO Allocations? An Analysis of 
‘Regular’ Investors” (2004) [unpublished], online: SSRN Electronic Library <papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=517302>. Cumming & MacIntosh, supra note 100 at 10-11. A 
famous example is Credit Suisse First Boston’s “Friends of Frank” list of clients preferred in IPO 
allocations. See SEC, Litigation Release 17327 (22 January 2002), online: U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission <http://www.sec.gov./litigation/litreleases/lr17327.htm>. At the peak of 
the tech bubble, a leading investment banker of CSFB used IPO shares as currency to bribe some 
of the venture capitalists, institutional investors, and corporate officers into providing business to 
his department. 
115  Bradley et al., supra note 112; Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, “Should Issuers 
be on the Hook for Laddering? An Empirical Analysis of the IPO Market Manipulation 
Litigation” U. Cin. L. Rev. [forthcoming in 2005], online: SSRN Electronic Library 
<papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=527684>; Lipton, supra note 82 at 3; Ritter & 
Welch, supra note 82 at 1815, report a “booster shot” at the end of the quiet period. 
116  Ritter & Welch, ibid. at 1800. 
117  The “Green Shoe” provision in underwriting contracts, named after Green Shoe Corp., the first 
firm to allow this provision, gives the members of the underwriting group the option to purchase 
additional shares at the offering price. Thus, underwriters may cover excess demand and 
oversubscription, at terms limited in time (up to 30 days) and limited in the quantity of shares the 
underwriters may buy (up to 15 per cent of the newly issued shares). The Green Shoe option is a 
benefit to underwriting syndicates and a cost to issuers. For details, see Ross, Westerfield & Jaffe, 
supra note 14 at 501-502 and 507. 
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structure.118 One can interpret an income trust offering as asset 
securitization of a specialized business, formerly held by PEIs. Asset 
securitizations use trust structures that are comparable to income trusts. 
Measured in high fixed transaction costs, asset securitization is a more 
expensive form of raising capital.119 Up-front costs include legal fees, 
asset review costs, and rating agency fees, while ongoing costs include 
credit enhancement cost, administrative fees, trustee fees, issuing fees, and 
agent fees. The same cost structure applies to income trusts. Second, as the 
main market-maker in an issue, a lead underwriter can acquire a 
significant amount of money in trading fees in the first weeks following an 
IPO.120 As a general trading pattern, institutional investors are likely to 
continue holding their shares, whereas if they had not received any shares 
in the first place they would have been unlikely to buy them in a hot 
aftermarket at higher prices.121 Traders in the first days are for the main 
part retailers who flip the shares allocated to them in an IPO. The fact that 
there are many more retail investors investing in income trust offerings, as 
compared to share offerings,122 is thus favourable to underwriters because 
it means higher trading fees.  
From Bay Street’s point of view, it is preferable to sell income trust 
units, rather than stocks, in a hot issues market. The characteristics 
associated with a hot market make it less likely that ‘reputational 
intermediaries’, who are supposed to keep the gates closed for bad 
products,123 will deny support to issues of businesses that are not as large, 
old, or mature as the businesses that triggered the income trust story in the 
first place. 
Entrepreneurs and Managers 
During the tech bubble, many VCs replaced founders and initial CEOs of 
firms, either in an early stage or, at the latest, when the firm was brought 
 
 
118  A presentation by Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP on income funds discussed even more 
complicated variations: notwithstanding the “simple” ‘Flow through Entity structure’, which is the 
basis of the analysis, there are the ‘Leveraged Income Fund Structure’ and the ‘Exchangeable Unit 
Structure’, online: Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP <http://www.blakes.ca>. 
119  Edward M. Iacobucci & Ralph A. Winter, “Asset Securitization and Asymmetric Information” 
(Paper written for the Northwestern University School of Law and Economics Colloquium Series, 
2003) [unpublished], online: Northwestern University School of Law <http://www.law 
.northwestern.edu/colloquium/law_economics/Iacobucci.pdf> at 11; Steven L. Schwarcz, “The 
Alchemy of Asset Securitization” (1994) 1 Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. 133 at 138-139. 
120  Ritter & Welch, supra note 82 at 1814. 
121  Ibid. at 1813. 
122  Mintz & Aggarwal, supra note 5 at 20. 
123  See Gilson & Kraakman, “MOME”, supra note 81 at 604-605 and 619-621. 
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to the capital markets.124 Thus, VCs had stronger influence over the young 
firms, since entrepreneurs tend to be obstinate. With respect to income 
trusts, these measures are usually unnecessary, because these businesses 
tend to be older businesses in which the influence of the founder has been 
absorbed, due to the size of the firm or its long history.125 These businesses 
are, therefore, primarily in the hands of external managers, though 
generalizations are not justified.126 
External managers are risk-averse due to a lack of diversification. 
Investors can reduce managerial agency costs by incentive compensation 
schemes and reputation,127 which will be particularly important if 
ownership and control are separated.128 Historically, external managers of 
tech companies were often experienced, but IPOs offered young managers 
selected by VCs the opportunity to develop their reputations as CEOs or 
CFOs of successful tech firms.129 If a manager was unsuccessful, a 
replacement could add new spirit to the firm. The incentive structure 
generally provided to managers in income trust businesses is slightly 
different. In order to demonstrate the maturity of a business, income trusts 
are often managed by managers who already have significant experience 
and solid reputations in the managerial market. The loss of this intangible 
asset, as well as the fact that sophisticated managers are likely to negotiate 
favourable contracts for themselves, makes a replacement of these 
managers costly to the firm.  
Both in tech firms and in income trust businesses, financial incentives 
should seek to align the interests of managers and investors. In addition to 
salaries, managers during the tech bubble often participated in the equity 
 
 
124  Hellmann & Puri, supra note 82 at 21. While entrepreneurs rarely survive in the first line of 
management, their influence in the second line of business, as chief of technology and operations, 
or other creative positions, generally remains quite strong. After the exit of a VC, entrepreneurs 
can become strong monitors, due to their knowledge of the business and significant shareholdings. 
125  Many businesses which are later restructured as income trusts are bought by PEIs from the former 
owners, in most cases the families and close associates of the entrepreneur, or other conglomerates 
seeking to sell segments of their businesses. For example, Osprey Media Income Fund has been 
structured out of 27 Hollinger newspapers through Management Buy Outs. 
126  The former CEO and director of Atlas Cold Storage Income Trust, Patrick Gouveia, who resigned 
in November 2003, is the firm’s second largest shareholder after TD Capital, the private equity 
subsidiary of Toronto Dominion Bank. See John Partridge, “New Atlas results paint cold reality” 
The Globe and Mail, Report on Business (2 February 2003) B11. 
127  Jensen & Meckling, supra note 48 at 312ff. 
128  See Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, revised 
ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1991) at 112ff. 
129  These reputational gains could offset the chilling effects on managerial efforts resulting from 
other restrictions imposed on managers by the size of the firm, the liquidity constraints resulting 
from growth, and market monitoring, especially by larger institutional investors and the 
entrepreneur. See, with respect to the concept of reputation as managerial incentive, Eugene F. 
Fama, “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm” (1980) 88 The Journal of Political 
Economy 288 at 293ff. 
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of the IPO firm, either directly by holding shares or indirectly via stock 
options and other performance-related incentive structures.130 
Accordingly, managers had strong incentives to go public in the first 
place, and to induce soaring stock prices afterwards. This aligned 
shareholders’ and managers’ interests since investors were supposed to 
receive their returns by selling shares rather than by dividend payouts. 
Income trust prospectuses now reveal that managers are tending to 
participate in distributions.131 Thus, investors’ and managers’ incentives 
are supposed to be aligned once again. 
The general weakness of incentive payments is the abuse of incentives 
for personal interests. To the same extent that soaring share prices might 
not reflect persistence of shareholder value,132 high distributions in the 
short run might not reflect solid cash flows in the long run. Furthermore, 
while in tech bubble IPOs the escrow period and negative market reaction 
prevented insider sales, many managers and entrepreneurs are now selling 
portions of their holdings in income trust issues without negative price 
effects, thereby reducing risks within their personal portfolio. Investor 
monitoring thus remains important.  
At first glance, though, the same aspect sounds less enthusiastic from 
the director’s perspective: the more efficient the investor monitoring, the 
less directors can lean back in the swivel chair. However, as scandals in 
the aftermath of the tech bubble have demonstrated, investor monitoring 
through the capital markets is ineffective in boom periods. 
Notwithstanding this general point, this article has held that neither high 
distributions nor trust law guarantee investor protection through explicit 
means to the same extent as do corporate law regimes.133 Two 
idiosyncratic features add to the impression that income trusts will allow 
for more managerial leeway than will the corporate form. First, income 
trusts are a retail product. Unlike institutional investors who can separately 
wield considerable influence over management through the control of 
large numbers of units, each retail investor acting separately and 
controlling relatively few units can exert very little influence over 
management. This often precipitates severe free-rider and collective action 
 
 
130  Lipton, supra note 82 at 5. 
131  Macquarie Power Fund at 53 (“incentive fee” for management company); Osprey Media Income 
Fund at 7 and “Long-Term Incentive Plan” at 29; Holiday Income Fund at 11 (management hold 
4.5 per cent in the Fund) and 33 (“Long-Term Incentive Plan”); Ag Growth Income Fund at 51 
(“Long-Term Incentive Plan” with minimum holding requirements for managers); Richards 
Packaging Income Fund at 27 (“Management Equity Incentive Plan”) and 54, especially profitable 
for CEOs; all supra note 11. 
132  Robert Franks et al., “Scandal Scorecard: Executives on Trial” Wall Street Journal (3 October 
2003). 
133  See “High Cash Returns?”, above at 61. 
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problems.134 Consequently, there is a good argument that the higher the 
proportion of retail investors, the lower the monitoring intensity of 
management. Second, takeovers become more risky for acquirers because 
the behaviour of atomistic retail investors is hard to predict.135 Managers 
are not as easy to oust in widely held retail investments as they are in 
investments with significant institutional shares. For these reasons, one 
can infer that managers and entrepreneurs prefer income trust offerings 
even to corporate IPOs. 
Politicians and Regulators 
Politicians and regulators are the official watchdogs of the public interest 
in capital markets. It can be surmised that both benefit from a strong 
economy because that usually results in high public approval of their 
monitoring and policy decisions. A booming capital market also bolsters 
the economy as a whole; the politicians and regulators could therefore be 
said to have an interest in preserving a boom. Under pressure to get 
elected, appointed, or re-appointed, politicians and regulators thus have 
strong incentives to avoid activity that could be blamed for causing a 
deflation in capital markets. For these reasons, they tend to refrain from 
talking negatively about the income trust boom. Politicians and regulators 
are thus unlikely to act in a way that could cause the bubble to burst.  
The former assumption is supported by the behaviour of American 
public watchdogs with respect to the tech bubble. It might have been 
observed that as long as tech stocks boomed, regulators were relatively 
passive. Although the overpricing and overstating was open and notorious 
during the tech bubble, the SEC did little to warn the public of the bubble 
dangers. Congress and the White House were similarly silent. Martin 
Lipton blames them for not providing sufficient funding to intervene in the 
market abuses.136 Despite sparse and unclear warnings, the Federal 
Reserve Bank did little to temper the capital markets. Regulators and 
legislators thus “stood idly by as the tech bubble grew”.137 This behaviour 
did not change until the tech bubble eventually burst.138 
The same patterns of behaviour might occur with respect to income 
trusts in Canada. Provincial capital market regulators have not made any 
 
 
134  Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1991) at 77. 
135  Ritter & Welch, supra note 82 at 1812. This, of course, may also increase management’s 
difficulties, as it cannot negotiate effectively with (institutional) investors. 
136  Lipton, supra note 82 at 4. 
137  Ibid. 
138  The regulatory mania is associated with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2002), 
reforms of the SEC rules, and the NYSE and NASDAQ-Listing standards. See Lipton, ibid. at 7ff. 
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serious efforts to prevent the use of marketing campaigns focused on tax 
advantages. The governments of Ontario and Alberta, which are the 
provinces with the most income trusts, have only acted to limit unitholder 
liability—an obstacle to institutional investors’ investments—rather than 
thinking of, and improving, direct investor control over income trusts. 
Finally, securities regulators have not yet agreed on a national policy. 
Under the Chretien Liberal majority, the federal government was mostly 
passive with respect to income trusts, narrowly focusing on tax leakages. It 
did not proactively attempt to curtail marketing that tends to lead to public 
misperceptions about the advantages of income trusts, which could have 
been accomplished by regulating the treatment of merely formal debt 
owed to the trust structure as equity. Presumably, in an election year, the 
federal government did not want to reduce the perceived benefits of 
income trust units to taxpayers. Overall, there is a cogent argument that 
politicians and regulators, ostensibly as watchdogs of capital markets, 
have in fact been complacent with respect to the potential harms that could 
result from the income trust boom. To some extent, it might be suggested 
that they have even facilitated the boom. 
Overoptimistic, Retail Driven Market 
Bubble Theory 
According to research in the behavioural finance field, a bubble can 
develop as a consequence of overoptimistic, uninformed “noise 
trading”,139 often proxied by retail investors, or as a consequence of limits 
on arbitrage.140  
1) Noise Trading. If institutional investors generally abstain from 
trading in one specific class of securities, two effects occur. First, 
the fewer interested institutional investors who participate in the 
market, the less effective is the book-building procedure, since 
there are no investors disclosing their ‘fair’ valuation of securities 
 
 
139  Shleifer & Summers, supra note 81 at 24ff. I do not address whether the optimistic beliefs are 
“irrational beliefs” about future cash flows or whether there is a rational ground for investors 
acting in a bubble, for example as provided by the “greater fool” theory; see Olivier Blanchard & 
Mark Watson, “Bubbles, Rational Expectations and Financial Markets” in Paul Wachtel, ed., 
Crises in the Economic and Financial Structure (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1982); 
Kenneth Froot & Maurice Obstfeld, “Intrinsic Bubbles: The Case of Stock Prices” (1991) 81 
American Economic Review 1189; Jose Scheinkman & Wei Xiong, “Overconfidence, Short-Sale 
Constraints and Bubbles” (Working Paper, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of 
Economics, 2002) [unpublished], online: The Social Science Computing Cooperative 
<http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~manuelli/879/OverconfidenceBubbles_Scheinkman.pdf>. 
140  Gilson & Kraakman, “MOME – the Hindsight Bias”, supra note 81 at 734-735. 
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to the underwriter. The effect might be that the old owners and the 
underwriters can raise unit prices above fair-market value. This 
creates inefficiencies in the primary market and affects the relative 
pricing of this security class. Second, recent studies141 have found 
that the market will be “more prone to the types of behavioural 
biases that lead to overly optimistic beliefs” and 
overconfidence.142 In turn, the market tends to be overpriced. 
Inefficiencies then occur in the secondary market. 
2) Limits on Arbitrage. In its business, an arbitrageur needs to find 
a lender for the securities that it will sell. Then the arbitrageur 
transfers collateral to the lender in the amount of 102 per cent of 
the value of the borrowed securities, before the arbitrageur can use 
the lender’s securities for, in essence, a bet on rising (long 
position) or declining (short position) prices of the security. 
Active arbitrage business thus requires a demand (arbitrageur) and 
a supply (lender) side. If there is either insufficient demand or 
insufficient supply, arbitrage business will not be made. On the 
demand side, arbitrageurs are generally institutional investors. 
Some institutional investors, particularly mutual funds, usually do 
not participate in trades on short positions with respect to 
stocks.143 There is also some evidence that hedge funds avoid 
short positions in highly volatile settings such as bubbles.144 The 
 
 
141  Brad Barber & Terence Odean, “Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common Stock 
Investment Performance of Individual Investors” (2000) 55 The Journal of Finance 773; Brad 
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of Behavior and Organization 47. 
142  Ofek & Richardson, “DotCom Mania”, supra note 82 at 1121. 
143  Joseph Chen, Harrison Hong & Jeremy C. Stein, “Breadth of Ownership and Stock Returns” 
(2002) 66 Journal of Financial Economics 171. According to the American Securities and 
Exchange Commission, only 43 per cent of mutual funds are authorized by their charters to sell 
short and only 2.5 per cent of the registered investment companies in the U.S. are actually 
engaged in short selling; see Staff Report No. 41 to the US SEC, “Implications of the Growth of 
Hedge Funds” (Sept. 2003) at 108, online: American Securities and Exchange Commission 
<http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/ hedgefunds0903.pdf>. Further, the Canadian National 
Instrument 81-102 Mutual Funds restricts mutual funds from certain short sales, though 
exemptions may be granted. Finally, the management of mutual funds benefits from rising unit 
prices through the management fee. Should they refrain from collecting money in order to 
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nor refraining from investment. There is, in fact, an analogy to the incentive structure by which 
VCs were induced to bring more and more firms to the market in the tech bubble despite the fact 
that these firms were immature. 
144  See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, “The Limits of Arbitrage” (1997) 52 The Journal of 
Finance 35. For empirical studies on hedge fund trading behavior in volatile settings see Markus 
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supply side of arbitrage comprises large, long-term investors, such 
as pension funds, insurance companies, and index investors. If 
fewer of these shareholders are in the market for a security, 
proportionately less arbitrage business will be made.145 
3) Collusion. The presence of noise traders in the market is 
insufficient, on its own, to explain bubbles, since the trading of 
optimistic noise traders is offset by pessimistic noise traders. 
Rather, the biases of noise traders must be consistent. Even then, 
“under perfect capital markets, fully informed traders with 
unlimited access to capital immediately pounce on incorrectly 
priced securities. If arbitrageurs were available to trade against the 
noise traders, then their action would suffice to return prices to 
efficient levels.”146  
Neither perfect capital markets nor fully informed traders with unlimited 
capital, however, exist. Reality consists of limited access to information 
and capital and thus limits the incidence of arbitrage. Furthermore, 
arbitrageurs, as opportunistic rather than altruistic market participants, act 
for profit, not for the promotion of efficient capital markets. An 
arbitrageur might profit from the valuation error of noise traders by taking 
either long or short positions in the anticipated future direction. If the 
prices are anticipated to rise, an arbitrageur might drive up the price of 
already overvalued stocks and thereby prolong and increase the 
overpricing.147 
In sum, relatively efficient markets can tip towards inefficiency under 
three conditions: if many investors are not rational in their investment 
decision; if there are observable cognitive biases directing the market 
towards overpricing; and if significant barriers prevent arbitrageurs from 
correcting the mistakes made by less-than-rational investors.148 
                                                                                                    
K. Brunnermeier & Stefan Nagel, “Hedge Funds and the Technology Bubble” (2004) 59 The 
Journal of Finance 2013 (including a list of further references). 
145  For details, see Gene D’Avolio, “The Market for Borrowing Stock” (2002) 66 Journal of Financial 
Economics 271. 
146  Gilson & Kraakman, “MOME – the Hindsight Bias”, supra note 81 at 720-721. 
147  J. Bradford DeLong et al., “Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing Rational 
Speculation” (1990) 45 The Journal of Finance 379; Jeremy Bulow & Paul D. Klemperer, 
“Rational Frenzies and Crashes” (1994) 102 Journal of Political Economy 1. 
148  Lawrence A. Cunningham, “Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance” (2002) 59 Wash. & 
Lee L. Rev. 767 at 774-780; Gilson & Kraakman, “MOME – the Hindsight Bias”, supra note 81 
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The Bubble of 1999 and 2000 
Though it is unclear whether noise trading or limits on arbitrage finally 
triggered the bubble, the tech bubble of 1999 and 2000 eventually showed 
both characteristics. Many observable trends suggested a level of arbitrage 
that was likely too low to correct inefficient pricing caused by irrational, 
overoptimistic investors. For instance, the sharp increase in IPOs 
corresponded to an increase in directors, officers, and shareholders subject 
to escrow agreements that prevented them from arbitrage business in tech 
stocks. Of greater significance is the data indicating that the tech bubble 
was primarily a retail-driven market. Accordingly, the market likely 
experienced trading by many investors with cognitive biases and there was 
probably a deficient level of arbitrage. A smaller constituency of large, 
long-term institutional investors in tech stocks implies a shortage of 
lending for arbitrage activity. It also implies that less-sophisticated traders 
moved market prices.  
In absolute terms, internet stock-holdings by institutional investors 
remain extensive, but measured in relative figures, these holdings are 
significantly lower, on average, than those in other stocks. Although 
internet stocks in the aggregate market were 4.38 per cent measured by 
total market capitalization, pension funds hold only 2.32 per cent of their 
total invested capital in tech stocks. In March 2000, the median holding of 
institutions for internet stocks measured by value was only 25.9 per cent, 
compared to 40.2 per cent for non-internet stocks. Though the difference 
was lower in IPO allocations, the difference was still significant (7.4 per 
cent).149 The allocation value itself, representing relatively certain gains 
during the first trading days, accounts for the lower difference.150  
Another situation indicates unusually low institutional-investor 
participation in internet stocks. In 1999 and early 2000, a number of 
internet-based mutual funds were created. The emergence of these internet 
mutual funds was not necessarily due to an institutional view of internet 
valuations. While these mutual funds statistically increase the share of 
institutional holdings, “it is clear that the funds themselves are simply 
pass-throughs to retail investors.”151 At the same time, the trading volume 
was relatively high. The average volume per stock during the tech bubble 
was three times higher for internet firms than for others,152 which might be 
explained by large numbers of investors speculatively day-trading on 
volatility. High trading volume is a proxy for retail activity, because 
 
 
149  Ofek & Richardson, “DotCom Mania”, supra note 82 at 1121. 
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institutional investors do not typically flip their stocks.153 Finally, levels of 
block trading, which functions as a proxy for institutional trading,154 
decreased. Lower block-trading levels represent less institutional trading 
and more retail trading in the market. Thus, low block trading seems to 
add to soaring stock prices.155 Therefore, “most of the puzzling high 
returns [from trading in internet stock] are associated with institutions 
avoiding at least one side of the transactions, presumably the buy side.”156 
Consistent with the theories mentioned above, lower institutional 
participation means fewer rational sales with a correcting effect on noise 
trades if prices soar and fewer shares for the supply side of arbitrage 
business and hence less hedging against soaring prices.  
Noise Trading and Limits on Arbitrage in Income Trusts 
Proving that overoptimistic noise traders have taken control of the income 
trust markets due to an absence of institutional investors, in the same 
manner as during the Tech Bubble, would require sufficient reliable data 
on block trades and trading volume, which are not publicly available.157 
The data that are available allows some basic suggestions to that effect.  
A rising overall market capitalization of income trust units relative to a 
broad market index can function as a very rough proxy for generally 
optimistic investors. In 2003, the S&P/TSX trust index was up 38.3 per 
cent, as compared to a 26.7 per cent rise in the broader S&P/TSX 
composite benchmark. The market capitalization of income trusts as of 
December 2003 was approximately Cdn$63.3 billion.158 As of April 15, 
2004, 147 issuers represented a market capitalization of approximately 
Cdn$90 billion, which would mean an increase of more than 55 per 
cent.159 Two factors, however, distort the data. First, new units were issued 
in the first quarter of 2004. These were predicted to amount to 
 
 
153  See “The Wall-Street / Bay-Street Industry”, above at 81. 
154  Charles Lee & Balkrishna Radhakrishna, “Inferring Investor Behavior: Evidence from TORQ 
Data” (2000) 3 Journal of Financial Markets 83; Gideon Saar, “Price Impact Asymmetry of Block 
Trades: An Institutional Trading Explanation” (2001) 14 Review of Financial Studies 1153. 
155  Ofek & Richardson, “DotCom Mania”, supra note 82 at 1123ff show that the median return in the 
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156  Ibid. at 1123-1124. 
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158  Allan Robinson, “Underwriting deals rise to highest in 5 years” The Globe and Mail, Report on 
Business (10 February 2004) B14; Willis & Church, supra note 30; Mintz & Aggarwal, supra 
note 5 at 4 (Mintz & Aggarwal have estimated that market capitalization of income trusts totalled 
approximately $57 billion and 123 issues at 9 September, 2003). 
159  Investcom, supra note 1. 
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approximately Cdn$2 billion.160 Second, different categories for the 
distinction between mutual funds and income funds might influence the 
quality of the data.  
Figure 2 (below) demonstrates the overall returns of income trust units 
(Payout and Unit Price) in the period between April 2001 and April 2004. 
Despite the fear of rising interest rates, income trust unit returns are still 
more than 10 per cent higher than stock returns. Due to the low average 
beta values of income trusts (generally between 0.3 and 0.4), one would 
assume that in the spring of 2004, when many economists predicted a 
general economic recovery, stocks of higher-risk businesses would soar 
higher than low-beta income trust units. Many income trusts issued new 
units in 2003.161 Thus, higher payouts are an unlikely explanation for the 
different levels of returns, since it would assume that underwriters and 
PEIs did not foresee these higher payouts when issuing prospectuses. 
Instead, Figure 2 suggests that prices for income trust units, on average, 
rose significantly during the last quarter of 2003 and the first quarter of 
2004. During this period, most retail investors made their annual RRSP 
investments.  
Figure 3 (below) shows data by CIBC World Markets in September 
2004.162 These data indicate that the performance of investments in shares 
that are listed in the TSX composite index rose 15 per cent within 32 
months, while investments in income trusts gained 70 per cent, with 
income trust small caps gaining approximately 75 to 80 per cent. As 
discussed above, net tax advantages are probably insubstantial and thus 
could not explain a difference in performance between shares and income 
trust units that extended to approximately 60 per cent within that period, 
given the environment of depressed share evaluations in the aftermath of 
the tech bubble in the winter of 2001. However, as unit prices are one 
factor in measuring the overall performance of a portfolio, the presence of 
irrationally optimistic market pricing symptomatic of a bubble does 
explain the extraordinary performance of income trust units, as compared 
to shares. 
 
 
160  Willis & Church, supra note 30. 
161  Ibid. (stating that 85 existing trusts tapped the markets in addition to 22 income trust IPOs). 
162  CIBC World Markets Income Trust Benchmark Indices, online: CIBC World Markets 
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Figure 2: Overall Returns of Income Trusts, as measured by S&P/TSX 
Capped Income Trust Index vs. S&P/TSX Total Return;  
© 2004 Bell Globemedia Inc., its affiliates and/or licensors. All 
rights reserved. 
 
Figure 3: Performance Comparison – Income Trusts vs. Common Equity, 
January, 2002 to October, 2004. © 2004 CIBC World Markets. 
All rights reserved. 
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Restrictions on arbitrage might have contributed to this high level of 
evaluation. Specifically, in the income trust market the restrictions might 
result from escrow agreements, which prohibit arbitrage by directors, 
officers, and large shareholders of income trust issuers with a market 
capitalization below Cdn$100 million after the conclusion of a share issue. 
Some income trust issues were smaller issues, and thus some limits on 
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arbitrage seemingly exist. Escrow agreements, however, are likely to cover 
relatively fewer stake holdings than during the tech bubble, as PEIs sell 
their shares in income trust offerings and, since 2002, large issues are not 
subject to escrow agreements at all.163 
Some data does exist regarding the number of potential arbitrageurs 
dealing in income trust units. Notwithstanding the holdings of non-
resident holders, which can include foreign institutions as well as 
individuals, Aggarwal & Mintz have provided evidence that institutional 
investors in income trusts hold 25.6 per cent of the overall units, as 
compared to 45.9 per cent in stocks.164 In business trusts, institutional 
holdings are estimated to comprise about 10 to 20 per cent of the units, 
while the institutional share in royalty trusts and REITs is between 30 and 
40 per cent.165 In light of these data, the difference with respect to business 
trusts is highly significant and signals that there are very few investors in 
business trusts who could lend shares to short-selling arbitrageurs.  
Table 1 lists data pertaining to investor participation in 36 Canadian 
income trust IPOs between February 2003 and October 2004, measured in 
percentage of the offering size.166  
In the periods covered by the data, between 36.4 per cent and 
51.34 per cent of the trust units were allocated to institutional investors in 
each quarter. Measured in average weight of the offerings, institutional 
participation varies between 37.64 per cent and 51.33 per cent per quarter. 
The highest institutional participation reached a height of 66.3 per cent 
in March 2004, with the lowest institutional participation in IPOs at 9.4 
per cent in May 2003.167 In contrast, usually 75 to 85 per cent of share 
IPOs are assigned to institutional investors.168 The data, however, does 
not distinguish between mutual funds and pension funds. Only the latter 
are likely to participate in arbitrage, and thus contribute to efficient 
securities prices. 
 
 
163  For details, see NP 46-201, supra note 105. With respect to the size of recent income trust issues, 
see Table 1. 
164  Mintz & Aggarwal, supra note 5 at 20 (data topical as of November 2003). 
165  Ibid. at 19. 
166  This table is based on data that were provided to the author by one of the commentators who 
declined to be mentioned by name. I sought to verify the data and although I did not find evidence 
of errors, it is important to note that some inaccuracies may remain. Consequently, the strength of 
the evidence provided by the data is limited. 
167  Overall, the institutional participation varies from quarter to quarter. I assume that this variety 
partially reflects the different stages of discussion with respect to unitholder liability and tax 
advantages for income trust investors. Thus, these data signal that institutional investors respond 
to some extent to the political uncertainty that surrounds the investment in income trusts. 
However, while the uncertainty decreased in the third and fourth quarter of 2004, the institutional 
participation in this period has not reached the level of the first quarter of 2004. 
168  Mintz & Aggarwal, supra note 5 at 33 (Appendix), citing sources at Merrill Lynch. The authors 
note, however, that institutions tend to reduce their ownership after IPOs. Thus, “a fair estimate of 
stable institutional ownership is 60 – 70%.” 
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Table 1: Allocation of Income Trust IPOs in 2003-2004  
2003     
Period Jan-Mar (pt) Apr-June Jul-Sep Oct-Dec 
Income Trust IPOs 3 6 4 8 
Amount Raised (in Cdn$ 
millions) 311 902 1,509 1,359 
Retail Investors 58.50% 63.60% 52.32% 59.80% 
Institutional Investments (by 
numbers) 41.5% 36.4% 47.68% 40.2% 
Institutional Investments 
(weighted average) 42.57% 37.64% 50.62% 47.08% 
          
Highest Institutional 
Participation 46.1% 60.0% 54.1% 63.3% 
Lowest Institutional Participation 35.0% 9.4% 41.8% 29.6% 
     
2004     
Period Jan-Mar Apr-June July-Sep Overall 
Income Trust IPOs 5 4 6 36 
Amount Raised (in Cdn$ 
millions) 720 541 595 5,937 
Retail Investors 48.66% 61.80% 51.87% 57.69% 
Institutional Investments (by 
numbers) 51.34% 38.2% 48.13% 42.31% 
Institutional Investments 
(weighted average) 51.33% 40.48% 46.87% 45.90% 
          
Highest Institutional 
Participation 66.3% 56.0% 60.7%   
Lowest Institutional Participation 43.0% 28.1% 29.6%   
Data also exist on investor demand-driven fund products. Mutual 
funds expressly marketing fixed income investments raise about 
Cdn$1.2 billion per month, primarily for income trust investments,169 
which, on an annual basis, would be sufficient to purchase all income 
trust issues of 2003. If these mutual funds invest according to their 
marketing, they cannot effectively diversify away from their prime 
investments, even though there are only weak products in the market. If 
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Canadian mutual funds, like their US counterparts, generally refrain 
from arbitrage business,170 the money flowing into these funds will not be 
apt to bring the prices back in line. It is, indeed, likely that Canadian 
mutual funds will continue to refrain from arbitrage business as well: 
mutual funds have no incentive to bet against rising prices in their fund 
products, since they benefit from investor enthusiasm in their specific 
class of securities. 
Due to insufficient underlying data or the necessity to rely on 
undisclosed data, the results of this article should be viewed with some 
caution. The data does, however, support the arguments that optimistic 
investors prevail in the market for income trusts and that there is a 
shortage of lenders for arbitrage business in income trust units, at least in 
business trusts. It is therefore likely that the prices of some income trusts 
have diverged from the fundamental value of the underlying business. 
Altogether, it seems quite evident that noise trading and a lack of 
arbitrage—a consequence of relatively less institutional investor 
participation in the market—probably tipped the market and triggered an 
ongoing bubble during the last quarter of 2003 and the first quarter of 
2004. Admittedly, these observations do not prove that the Canadian 
income trust market is now a full-blown bubble, but they certainly  
indicate that a bubble probably exists to some extent. Rebutting this claim 
thus demands equally cogent counterarguments based on sound 
observations. In a sense, the burden has shifted. Sell-side marketers and 
commentators who support growth in and entry into the income trust 
market need to explain why the market is probably not a bubble. What is 
their counter-proof? 
Arguments Against the Existence of a Bubble 
After examining the sensitivity of prices of income trust units to general 
economic variables, Halpern, Norli, and Timbrell have maintained that the 
bubble risk in income trust units is low.171 They have held that there is no 
indication that income trust units have been overpriced as an asset class 
and that overpricing is unlikely to develop in the future.172 Their sample of 
 
 
170  Joseph Chen, Harrison Hong & Jeremy C. Stein, “Breadth of Ownership and Stock Returns” 
(2002) 66 Journal of Financial Economics 171. According to the American Securities and 
Exchange Commission, “Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds, Staff Report No. 41 to the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission” (September 2003), at 108, online: U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission <http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf>, 
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of the registered investment companies in the US are actually engaged in short selling. 
171  Ofek & Richardson, “DotCom Mania”, supra note 82 at 1133. 
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economic factors and income trust performance is based on the period 
from 1996 to 2002.173 In contrast, as stated above, this article argues that 
noise trading and a lack of arbitrage tipped the market during the last 
quarter of 2003 and the first quarter of 2004. Therefore, Halpern, Norli, 
and Timbrell’s study deals with market analysis of a different time  
period and for that reason cannot offer valid counter-proofs of the  
present findings. 
In order to achieve more focused results, three methodological 
changes for further studies might nevertheless be recommended. First, 
Halpern, Norli, and Timbrell compare the returns of specific kinds of 
businesses (old and large) with a mix of businesses within the S&P/TSX 
Index. In order to achieve comparable results, all businesses with a 
different market beta than the average income trust market beta (between 
0.3 and 0.4) should be excluded from the sample. Otherwise, a sample of 
weak and strong firms, in terms of free cash flow and the TSX Index, will 
be compared with a sample comprised exclusively of strong firms. 
Second, the analysis does not distinguish between royalty trusts and REITs 
on the one hand and, on the other hand, firms that have nothing to sell but 
a strong business position repackaged as an income trust. Third, the 
sample period of the analysis should take into account at least one 
business cycle of the underlying businesses. Taking the extraordinary 
costs of restructuring, the repeated public offerings, the restraints on 
growth, and research and development into account, restructuring a 
business as an income trust might not yield extraordinary returns that can 
account for stock prices soaring up to 17.12 per cent (which is, according 
to Halpern, Norli, and Timbrell, the premium that investors in the market 
put on securities of businesses that announce a plan to restructure into an 
income trust). 174  
Halpern, Norli, and Timbrell have predicted, under the condition that 
there are institutional investors in the market, that overpricing is unlikely 
to occur in the future. Thus, the presence of institutional investors would 
enhance the maturity in the market for income trusts, resulting in an 
improvement in the quality of operating companies structured as income 
trusts as well an improvement in corporate-governance provisions.175 In 
the past, the discussion about unitholder liability might have discouraged 
institutional investors from investing in income trust units. Legislation in 
Alberta,176 legal opinions holding that unitholder liability is unlikely,177 
 
 
173  Ibid. at 15. 
174  Ibid. at 13. 
175  Ibid. at 4. 
176  The Income Trusts Liability Act, supra note 66, states that unitholders are indemnified from liability. 
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and forthcoming legislation in Ontario178 are designed to clarify  
the situation. 
Even if concerns about unitholder liability are resolved, it does not 
follow that institutional investment in income trusts will escalate to 
relative holdings on par with that observed in other types of businesses. 
Other obstacles to institutional investment still exist and, in the meantime, 
more were arising. The assumption by Halpern, Norli, and Timbrell that 
the tax treatment of income trusts would not change179 has become 
dubious given the proposed federal government plan to limit pension fund 
investment in these businesses. In fact, this contemplated development in 
tax law observably stalled pension fund investment in the income trust 
market.180 Another problem that still exists as a check on institutional 
investment involves uncertainty surrounding the laws of trust 
governance.181 Institutional investors have lobbied for mandatory 
governance requirements because the inclusion of income trusts in TSX 
stock indices practically forces institutional investors to purchase trust 
units.182 In addition, the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance has 
signalled that it is “going to become more aggressive” with respect to 
income trust governance.183 The fact that institutional investors are so 
concerned about governance issues implies that their current investment 
levels in the income trust market are lower than their investments in the 
broader market.  
 
 
178  Bill 35, Trust Beneficiaries' Liability Act, 2003, 1st Sess., 38th Leg., Ontario, 2003, online: 
Legislative Assembly of Ontario   
<http://www.ontla.on.ca/documents/Bills/38_Parliament/Session1/b035_e.htm> (reintroduced as 
the Trust Beneficiaries’ Liability Act, 2004 by Bill 106, Budget Measures Act, 2004 (No. 2), 1st 
Sess., 38th Leg., Ontario, 2004 (second reading debated October 12, 14, 18), online: Legislative 
Assembly of Ontario <http://www.ontla.on.ca/documents/Bills/38_Parliament/Session1/ 
b106_e.htm>). The Trust Beneficiaries’ Liability Act, 2004 specifies that the beneficiaries of a 
trust are not liable, as beneficiaries, for any act, default, obligation or liability of the trust or any of 
its trustees. However, this protection for beneficiaries is restricted: it applies only for acts, 
defaults, obligations or liabilities that occur when a trust is a reporting issuer under the Securities 
Act and is governed by the laws of Ontario, and it applies only for acts, defaults, obligations or 
liabilities that occur after the Bill receives Royal Assent.  
179  Halpern, Norli & Timbrell, supra note 1 at 2-3. 
180  See “Long-Term Investment Argument?”, above at 59. One could also interpret the Federal 
Government’s tax step as risk reduction that is designed to avoid liquidity problems of pension 
plans, in case the bubble bursts. 
181  See “Debt as Discipline?”, above at 62. 
182  Karen Howlett, “Governance rules urged for trusts before TSX entry” The Globe and Mail, Report 
on Business (19 February 2004) B6. 
183  Elizabeth Church, “Income trusts to face more scrutiny, panel told” The Globe and Mail 
(29 September 2004) B12. 
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In summary, while Halpern, Norli, and Timbrell’s analysis may 
suggest that fears about a bubble in the income-trust market were probably 
unfounded as of a few years ago, it does not provide valid evidence that 
the market price of income trust units has not recently diverged from the 
fundamental value of the underlying businesses.  
Conclusion 
The current income trust boom shares three characteristics with the tech 
bubble. First, normal businesses have leveraged on the income trust story. 
Second, a strong convergence of interests exists among private-equity 
investors, managers, financial consultants, and even politicians. All of 
these groups benefit from the boom in the income trust market. The 
structural complexity of income trusts and the nature of unit offerings to 
the public suggest that private equity investors, financial industry 
professionals, and managers probably prosper even more from the income 
trust boom and experience an even stronger convergence of interests than 
they did during the Tech Bubble. Finally, the data suggests that 
overoptimistic retail investors dominate the income trust market, so there 
is a smaller constituency of institutional investors—particularly large, 
long-term funds such as pension plans—to supply funds for efficiency-
improving arbitrage.  
Under these conditions, although this article has not technically 
proven that prices have diverged from the values inherent in the 
underlying businesses, it seems probable that overpricing in the market for 
income trust units exists. The counter-proof provided by Halpern, Norli, 
and Timbrell is inconclusive, since it covers a different time period. 
Additionally, their predictions rely on increasing institutional investor 
activity, but the relative level of institutional investment in income trusts is 
still lower than in ordinary corporations.  
V POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Whether the Bubble characteristics result from incomplete tax integration, 
policies for debt and equity distributions,184 irrational cognitive biases of 
individual investors, or institutional limits on arbitrage, the same three 
consequences follow, each of which warrants advisories to investors and 
policy recommendations. 
 
 
184  Mintz & Aggarwal, supra note 5 at 23ff. 
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1) Capital markets price income trust units too optimistically. 
Investors cannot rely on the quoted prices of units to inform 
themselves about the underlying value of a business; instead 
investors need to evaluate a full array of available information on 
their own. 
2) Overpricing facilitates a misallocation of capital. When investors 
are overly enthusiastic about a sector’s prospects, the sector will 
receive more capital than justified by the real economic 
productivity of businesses in that sector. This capital misallocation 
results in wealth destruction: resources are diverted from 
investment in businesses that could use them to generate relatively 
higher real economic returns.185 
3) Inefficient capital markets distort managerial incentives. This 
occurs in two ways. First, capital markets do not furnish 
accurate information about management performance. As a 
result, bad managers have more leeway than is appropriate 
and good managers are deprived of their rewards. Second, 
unjustified high valuations render takeovers less likely. (As far 
as disciplining management, it should be re-emphasized that 
direct investor control in income trusts is also unlikely to be 
feasible or effective.186) In these times of intensifying 
international competition in product markets, Canada is well 
advised to avoid a long period in which capital markets allocate 
capital inefficiently. 
The above consequences indicate that capital market inefficiency in 
income trusts is a serious issue that needs to be addressed by policy-
makers. The greater question is whether, and to what extent, Canadian 
income trust vendors should address not only this issue but also all of the 
related problems with income trusts that have been explained in 
this article.  
First, do we need regulatory action? (This is a question on which the 
Alberta government has recently asked stakeholders to comment.187) 
One may answer this question in the negative by calling for renewed 
faith in market forces, arguing that the market has already addressed 
 
 
185  Hendershott, supra note 82 at 283. 
186  See “Debt as Discipline?”, above at 62.  
187  Alberta Revenue, Income Trusts: Governance and Legal Status (discussion paper) (July 2004), 
online: Alberta Finance Ministry <http://www.finance.gov.ab.ca/publications/ 
2004_0728_income_trusts_discussion_paper.pdf>. 
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and will continue to address the most pressing issues surrounding 
income trusts. The liability problem being solved, one might see some 
growth in institutional investment as a reason to believe that the threat of 
a full-blown bubble is unfounded. Furthermore, development of income 
trust rating criteria by DBRS and Standard & Poor might increase 
transparency in the market for income trusts.188 Turning to income trust 
governance, one could cite the rarity of management companies which 
mitigate unitholder influence over governance. It has been observed that 
sponsors have a harder time selling income trust issues in which 
unitholders have no say. One could provide evidence for a viable capital 
market: even though at least four income trusts have suspended their 
monthly distributions,189 investors have not been affected by a panic 
pertaining to income trusts units in general. Instead, the market has 
distinguished between good and bad products, just like other, more mature 
security markets do. In addition, a recent fear of increasing interest rates 
has led to a decline in income trust unit prices,190 demonstrating that the 
income trust market is not disconnected from macroeconomic 
developments. In short, one could argue that the market is maturing, and 
thus no regulation is necessary.  
This view neglects three lessons offered by the tech bubble. First, we 
do not know how seriously the bust period will depress investor 
confidence. While the American market received a relatively soft 
landing after the tech bubble, the international experience demonstrates 
that bubbles can seriously undermine investor confidence in securities 
markets in the long run. For example, the bust period following the tech 
bubble hit German capital markets particularly severely. Though there is 
no evidence that large and established corporations were involved in 
fraudulent activities, investor confidence was devastated.191 The 
traditionally weak IPO market literally ceased to exist for over a year, 
which prevented primarily young firms from gaining external financing, 
and led to a decline in share issuances by large firms as well.192 Thus, 
 
 
188  Carrick, supra note 15.  
189  Hot House Growers Income Fund, Harterm Income Fund, Atlas Cold Storage Income Trust, and 
Legacy Hotels REIT. 
190  Andrew Willis, “Trust units are in slide” The Globe and Mail (24 April 2004) B7. 
191  German shareholders associate corporate scandals primarily with young tech stocks and the Neuer 
Markt; see the list of 45 firms that either went bankrupt or were subject to examinations by the 
Federal Agency for Financial Services, Manager Magazin Online: <http://www.manager-
magazin.de/geld/artikel/0,2828,186368,00.html>. See also Dirk Zetzsche, Explicit and Implicit 
System of Corporate Control – A Convergence Theory of Shareholder Rights (LL.M. thesis, 
University of Toronto, Faculty of Law, 2004) [unpublished], at 80ff, online: SSRN Electronic 
Library <http://ssrn.com/abstract=600722>. 
192  In 2003, there was not a single IPO of domestic issuers in Germany. The IPO market, measured in 
market value and Million €, developed as follows: 10,474 (1999), 26,558 (2000), 2,692 (2001), 
249 (2002), 0 (2003), 1,977 (January to August 2004). Already listed firms issued shares, 
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advocates of income trusts should not gamble on a soft landing and on the 
market’s ability to easily restore investor confidence. Second, income 
trust units are a product in which retail investors heavily invest as part of 
their retirement and pension plans. These funds secure a livelihood for 
retirees and should not be gambled with. This lesson was taught to 
American corporate pension funds of major companies, such as General 
Electric, in the aftermath of the tech bubble. There is no indication that 
Canadian investors are more inclined to take risks than their American 
neighbours when their pensions may potentially be affected. Finally, 
many market measures that currently exist, while ensuring profitable 
business for the securities industry, do not effectively address retail 
investors’ concerns. For example, ratings are a nice add-on if investors 
may exercise strong rights on the basis of this information. Ratings do 
not, however, solve the problems of investors that are locked into firms 
with sponsor-oriented, rather than investor-oriented, governance 
structures. Not all income trusts are rated; thus investors may suffer 
from adverse selection in a market where information about investment 
quality is not always available and standardized. This makes it difficult 
to compare businesses and weed out those that are bad investments. Well-
managed heavyweight players, such as TransCanada Power, Yellow 
Pages, or Gaz Metro, benefit from ratings. In contrast, the bad apples—or, 
in the case of Hot House Growers, bad tomatoes—are unlikely to strive for 
ratings. With more than 160 income trusts already in the market, many of 
them issued under the promise of high distributions while at the same 
time foregoing high governance standards, regulatory activity is required 
to protect investors from the bad, rather than from the good, players in 
the market.  
If legislative activity is required, what should promulgators do in 
order to protect investors? The American Sarbanes-Oxley legislation 
has proven how easily legislative activism may replace sound 
legislative considerations.193 In light of this experience, participants in 
the income trust market should be aware of the dangers of overreaction. 
For example, recommending the abolishment of income trusts 
would overlook investors’ desires for higher current cash payouts (at 
                                                                                                    
measured in market value and Million €, as follows: 31,341 (1999), 18,721 (2000), 7,971 (2001), 
3,025 (2002), 12,231 (2003). Source: Deutsches Aktieninstitute, Factbook (2003), online: 
Deutsches Aktieninstitute <http://www.dai.de>. 
193  See Michael Skapinker, “‘Thou shalt not steal’ would have done nicely, thanks”, Financial Times 
(1 December 2004), 8. 
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the expense of future payouts or share price increases). Consequently, a 
recommendation needs to carefully distinguish between the good and the 
bad aspects of income trusts. According to the above argument, the 
basic principle of income trust regulation must be to avoid creating any 
incentive that makes investment in income trusts more advantageous 
than investment in other business models for reasons independent of 
fundamental valuations. Ideally, regulators should aim for a regime where 
incentives for income trust investment are only related to the quality of the 
underlying business and the specialty pay-out service (that is, its policy to 
favour higher cash distributions in the present).  
This analysis reveals four idiosyncratic features of income trusts that 
render the income trust boom less advantageous to society than many 
vendors and other interested parties would have public investors believe: 
tax advantages for investments in low-growth businesses, unclear trust 
governance, management discretion with respect to future payouts, and 
insufficient participation of institutional investors. Furthermore, the 
problem of potential conflicts of interest in which broker-dealers and 
mutual fund managers find themselves when selling income trust related 
products are also discussed. Rather than providing an analysis of all of the 
implications, the following recommendations on these issues are intended 
to enrich future debate. Hence, they might miss some aspects that future 
research will reveal. 
Avoid Investment Incentives for Low-Growth Businesses 
The tech bubble revealed that retail investors are more responsive to 
seemingly simple, but false, theories about business value than are 
sophisticated investors. Misleading claims about the advantageous nature 
of an investment are particularly persuasive when they involve supporting 
reasons based on opinions about preferential legal treatment such as lower 
assessments. Retail investors are more inclined to believe expert opinions, 
insofar as they are made with respect to matters that can be analysed on 
the grounds of reason. Thus, income trust promulgators should generally 
avoid creating legal advantages that may further investment in one 
investment form over the other, notwithstanding one exception: 
externalities provided by innovative businesses justify a differential legal 
treatment as the societal benefits exceed the investors’ private benefits.194 
 
 
194  See Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, “Legal and Institutional Barriers to Financing Innovative Enterprise in 
Canada” (monograph prepared for the Government and Competitiveness Project, School of Policy 
Studies, Queen's University, Discussion Paper 94-10, 1994) [unpublished] at 8; see also Paul A. 
Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Money of Invention: How Venture Capital Creates New Wealth 
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Innovative businesses are, however, unlikely to be structured as income 
trusts: if all available cash is invested in invention, they cannot provide the 
necessary distributions. Therefore, in terms of general policy choices, 
recognizing the social waste from capital misallocation and the 
impressionability of retail investors in a bubble market, regulators should 
strive to implement policies such as tax reforms that neutralize incentives 
to invest high levels of capital in income trusts in order to take advantage 
of perceived benefits from preferential legal treatment such as tax savings. 
This makes it more likely that the pricing function of capital markets will 
allocate financial resources to businesses that can use them most 
productively.195  
Corporate Law as the Minimum Standard for Quoted Trust Units 
Given that the promise of high distributions is unlikely to effectively 
discipline managers196 and given that market control over income trusts is 
inefficient due to the bubble characteristics, I recommend an asymmetric 
paternalistic approach.197 I propose default rules that sophisticated 
investors can avoid but that are nonetheless binding on unsophisticated 
investors. Asymmetric paternalism has become common in securities 
regulation. With the assumption that sophisticated investors are less prone 
to irrational arguments than are retail investors, Canadian securities 
regulation exempts “accredited investors” from the prospectus requirement 
for public distributions.198 The prospectus requirement is thus a default 
rule for retail investors.  
What kind of default rule is most likely to solve the income trust 
problems? The problems that the “bad apples” provide to the market, 
and that were mentioned above, are similar to those that corporate 
                                                                                                    
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2001); OECD, The New Economy: Beyond the 
Hype, Final Report on the OECD Growth Project: Executive Summary (Paris: OECD, 2001) at 
12ff, online <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/2/26/2380634.pdf>. 
195  One could argue that the actual success of income trusts in recent years furthers investor trust in 
capital markets, in general, and is thereby a good thing. However, this effect is unlikely to last 
longer than the bubble itself. 
196  See “Debt as Discipline?”, above at 62. 
197  Colin Camerer et al., “Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for 
‘Asymmetric Paternalism’” (2003) 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1211. 
198  See e.g. Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, s. 72 [OSA], as supplemented by R.R.O. 1990, 
Reg. 1015 and as further supplemented and qualified by s. 1.1 of Rule 45-501 (2001) 24 OSCB 
7011. The exemption is modelled after U.S. Regulation D, Rule 501, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501. 
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law deals with.199 Corporate law works out and supplies rules that, if 
uniformly applied, will maximize the value of the corporate endeavour as 
a whole.200 Although Anglo-American corporate law is primarily 
enabling or facilitative, mandatory rules are not objectionable per se. A 
basic framework of rules is necessary as a means of protecting the process 
of private ordering from abuse. A minimum of mandatory rules on 
investor protection is thus part of the value maximization through 
corporate law.  
If negotiating trust indentures themselves, sophisticated investors 
would likely require entitlement to the minimum rights that shareholders 
have in ordinary corporations. In particular, the right to elect directors and 
the right to an oppression remedy would be introduced, both of which 
provide for direct influence on managerial behaviour that goes against 
investor interests. Thus, investment products that neither meet the 
minimum standards of corporate law, nor provide viable substitutes for 
these rights, are sub-optimally structured, as measured by the standard of 
wealth maximization as a whole. Being confronted with a sub-optimal 
offer, sophisticated investors would renegotiate, demand a discount, or 
refrain from the investment. Retail investors, however, might not 
understand the impact of the complicated trust structure on their 
investments, even though it is explained in lengthy prospectuses. This lack 
of sophistication accounts for my proposal that sales of income trust units 
the do not yield the same minimum rights to investors that are held by 
shareholders in a corporation should be restricted to “sophisticated 
purchaser[s] who [are] capable of protecting [their] own interests without 
legislative interference.”201 
Empower Investors to Approve Distribution Policy 
North American corporate law has only recently begun to address the 
problem of managerial slack by empowering investors to decide upon 
distributions.202 The fact that this development did not begin earlier is 
 
 
199  See Robert H. Sitkoff, “Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Capital Market Efficiency” (2003) 28 J. 
Corp. L. 565. 
200  Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 134 at 35-36; for the UK, Robert Goddard, “Modernising 
Company Law: The Government’s White Paper” (2003) 66 Mod. L. Rev. 402 at 406ff. 
201  Jeffrey G. MacIntosh & Christopher C. Nicholls, Securities Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2002) 
at 177. 
202  Though in theory American corporate law enables shareholders to propose special rules, the 
process necessarily requires the involvement of regulators, insofar as dividends are concerned. For 
example, shareholders of Cisco Systems, Inc. recently launched a shareholder proposal to vote on 
the declaration of a quarterly dividend. See Cisco Systems, Inc., 2002 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 
para. 78,330 (avail. 19 Sept 2002). In Potlatch Corp., 2002-2003 Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at para. 
78,450 (avail. 18 Feb 2003) shareholders proposed that the board prepare a report explaining a 
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probably due to the United States’ focus on high-growth firms. In the 
absence of bubble characteristics, high-growth firms have fewer 
problems related to managerial spending on private returns than do low-
growth firms. High-growth firms typically have much less free cash 
compared to low-growth firms, which have relatively fewer profitable 
projects in which to invest. Hence low-growth firms experience liquidity 
restraints that can effectively discipline against managerial slack. VCs 
take advantage of this disciplining effect by purposefully infusing capital 
in stages in order to limit the free cash available to management.203 
When those promoting investment in low-growth firms structured as 
income trusts cite the benefit of reduced managerial slack through 
distribution policies that create liquidity restraints, those promoters fail to 
account for the essential fact that managers of the underlying low-growth 
business usually decide upon the distribution policy and have the 
discretion to change it. This discretion is likely to offset the effect of the 
high-yield promise in the prospectus once the firm has failed to meet its 
payout promise.204  
One might be tempted to suggest that managerial slack could be 
reduced by structuring income trusts in a way that leaves management 
with no discretion over distribution policies. However, this would not be 
advisable. In order to avoid bankruptcy, as was the case with many 
management buyouts during the 1980s, even low-growth businesses need 
flexibility. As an intermediate solution, regulations could be implemented 
declaring that investors must decide upon, or at least ratify, the distribution 
policy of the income trusts in which they invest. Like dividends, proposals 
to unitholders by management seeking to change the distribution policy 
would send a signal to the market furnishing valuable information that 
could result in efficiency-improving unit-price adjustments. Specifically, 
the trust indenture could stipulate that managers need to pay out at least 
85 per cent of the cash flow within one year. Managers would have the 
flexibility to pay out more in profitable quarters and less in unprofitable 
quarters, as long as they pay out 85 per cent of the annual cash flow. 
                                                                                                    
corporation’s past and current dividend policy. In both cases, the SEC staff declined permission to 
omit the proposal from the management’s circular, pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i) of Regulation 14A 
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In European companies, the right to decide upon how 
to use profits of a corporation is usually vested in shareholders, see ss. 119 (1) Nr. 2, 174 (1) 
AktG (Germany); Art. L. 232-11, 232-12 French Code de Commerce; Art. 102 of Table A to 
British Companies Act of 1985. 
203  Sahlman, supra note 102 at 507. 
204  See “Debt as Discipline?”, above at 62. 
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Changes to such policies should require approval by unitholders. 
Although investors are likely to follow managerial proposals in the proxy 
circular, sudden changes will require a satisfactory explanation. 
Furthermore, under the concept stated above (corporate law as the 
minimum standard for quoted trust units), changes may affect the re-
election prospects of managers. 
Avoid Limits on Institutional Holdings 
In order to achieve rational market pricing, institutional investor 
participation, particularly that of pension funds, is necessary in the 
market for income trusts. Consequently, promulgators should avoid any 
limit on institutional investment in income trusts, such as the limits 
included in the federal government’s later-withdrawn proposal in the 
spring of 2004. Assuming that the government heeds this policy 
recommendation, and assuming that all of the other policy 
recommendations I have advanced are respected as well, then the 
market may be able to determine whether the costs incurred in 
restructuring a business into an income trust (including consulting fees), in 
addition to the costs incurred in repeat issuances of units to raise capital 
for new projects, are in total an amount that is likely to offset any 
beneficial tax treatment of investment in income trusts. If such a 
determination could be made both repeatedly and reliably, capital 
market pricing of income trust units would be much more efficient, 
incorporating more accurate information about the real net value that 
these business structures generate. As evidenced by the assumption at the 
outset, such an efficiency-improving calculation is premised upon a 
greater share of institutional investment in the market for income 
trusts. However, the claim that an increase in the participation of 
institutional investors would check the income trust bubble is debatable. 
The quality of some underlying businesses will attract more institutional 
investors than today, while institutional investors will avoid investment 
in other opportunities. Under the conditions stated in this article, 
however, if institutional investors avoid investing in certain income 
trusts, there will be no excuses other than concerns relating to the 
underlying business.  
Broker and Mutual Funds Regulation 
Finally, regulators must increasingly watch broker-dealers’ and mutual 
fund managers’ conduct. Broker-dealers need to be watched as a means of 
protecting retail investors from the marketing of investment products on a 
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broad scale to investors for whom the opportunities are inappropriate. 
Mutual funds, meanwhile, should be monitored in order to avoid an over-
supply of investment capital into narrow markets. I have held that the 
complex structure of income trusts strongly encourages vendors to 
exaggerate arguments for investment in these entities and, further, that 
mutual funds acquire more cash than can be invested in good investment 
opportunities, thereby driving the prices of income trust units higher than 
what is justifiable upon a fundamental valuation. The incentives of the 
securities industry to drive up the prices of securities do not primarily 
regard idiosyncrasies of income trusts. Both problems have been recently 
addressed by promulgators,205 but a few issues in particular should be 
considered by regulators. 
With respect to broker-dealers, regulators should require that retail 
investors receive information about the specific risk and governance 
structure of income trusts. In particular, prospectuses and brokers must 
clearly explain the equity-like risk structure and the preconditions of tax 
advantages to investors. While recent prospectuses disclose these risks, I 
have some doubts as to whether brokers present these details explicitly 
when selling income trust units; if they did, the public perception of a 
bond-like risk structure would not exist in the first place. Furthermore, the 
prospectuses may contain declarations with regard to intended splits 
between retail and institutional investment from the planned allotment in 
an income trust IPO. Broker-dealers should be required to inform retail 
investors about this split and about the ratio of institutional-to-retail 
investment in securities with a similar risk structure. In particular, broker-
dealers should be required to disclose to investors that a lack of 
institutional investors may result in lax oversight of management, as 
compared to corporations. 
With respect to mutual funds, two measures may help investors 
understand the correlation between soaring unit prices and the mutual fund 
industry. First, as a precondition for purchasing mutual funds, investors 
should receive information with respect to the (projected) volume of IPOs 
in the market for specific securities, as compared to the amount of cash 
that flows into the relevant funds. This, in general, requires a 
strengthening of the disclosure rules with respect to the fund industry. 
Second, retail investors should receive a mandatory explanation of the 
 
 
205  See Ontario, Ministry of Finance, Five Year Review Committee Final Report – Reviewing the 
Securities Act (Ontario) (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2003) c. 19 (“Mutual Fund 
Governance”). Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with broker liability, for example, 
in Laflamme v. Prudential-Bache Commodities Canada Ltd., [2000] 1 S.C.R. 638; Hodgkinson v. 
Simms, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377; the Ontario Court of Appeal in Anger v. Berkshire Investment Group 
Inc. (2000), 141 O.A.C. 301. 
Winter 2005 The Need for Regulating Income Trusts 
Copyright © 2005. University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review. All rights reserved. 
109
possible effects of capital oversupply in narrow markets. Rational 
investors, however, may nevertheless invest in funds with excess financial 
resources in order to cash in the short-term gains that a capital oversupply 
in a narrow market (almost) guarantees. Consequently, the other measures 
which I have proposed in this section remain important.  
VI CONCLUSION 
The current income trust boom has striking similarities to the tech bubble 
of 1999 and 2000. Specifically, overstated marketing arguments induce 
unsophisticated retailers to invest in businesses which might not be able to 
benefit from the income trust structure. As a consequence, the income trust 
boom exhibits characteristics associated with a bubble: story leverage; 
opportunistic support by interested parties; and overoptimistic retail 
investors. In order to prevent the bubble from bursting, four steps need to 
be taken: first, avoiding tax incentives for investments in low-growth 
businesses; second, structuring trust law to require governance controls 
equivalent to those mandated by corporate law if the units are to be issued 
to the public, while restricting investments in trust units that do not meet 
this condition to sophisticated investors; third, empowering investors to 
decide upon the distribution policy of a trust; and fourth, avoiding 
limitations of pension fund holdings in income trusts. Furthermore, a strict 
approach in regulating broker-dealers’ and mutual fund managers’ sale 
practices is apt to augment the aforementioned measures. Income trusts 
can provide benefits to investors, to businesses, and to the economy in 
general, but only if they develop with the support of some of the enabling 
and guiding mechanisms of well-functioning capital markets and 
sophisticated regulatory regimes. 
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